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This dissertation contains three essays. In Chapter 2, I investigate the causal factors of 
the soft budget constraint (SBC) problem. Based on a panel dataset from a survey of 
Chinese enterprises, the test results support the policy burden hypothesis but not the 
ownership hypothesis. The findings emphasize the importance of creating a sound 
social security system in the process of China’s enterprise reform.  
 
The other two essays focus on the upgrading of counties to cities in China. Chapter 3 
examines its role in providing local governments with incentives on economic growth. 
Using a large panel data set covering all counties during 1993-2004, I find that the 
official minimum requirements for upgrading are not enforced in practice. Instead, a 
county’s economic growth rate plays a key role in obtaining city status. Furthermore, 
I conduct an empirical test to distinguish between a principal-agent incentive 
mechanism and political bargaining. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
  
that the central government uses upgrading to reward local officials for high growth, 
as well as aligning local interests with those of the center. This essay highlights the 
importance of both fiscal and political incentives facing the local government. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the consequences of upgrading by looking at various economic, 
fiscal and public service outcomes. I find that city status increases government size 
and revenues, and creates more urban employment opportunities. However, there is 
no significant improvement in local public services after counties were upgraded, and 
their high growth rates dropped. These results are interpreted by analyzing the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation studies several important issues in China’s economic reform that 
started in 1978.  
Chapter 2 studies enterprise reform.  There are two competing theories about the 
causal factors of soft-budget constraint (SBC) problem, namely the ownership 
hypothesis and the policy burden hypothesis. While the ownership hypothesis 
attributes the SBC problem to government ownership, the policy burden hypothesis 
predicts that privatization would not eliminate the SBC problem, as long as the major 
policy burden – maintaining employment – is not removed from enterprises. My 
results support the policy burden hypothesis but not the ownership hypothesis. This 
finding emphasizes the importance of creating a sound social security system in the 
process of China’s enterprise reform. 
In Chapter 3 and 4, I turn my focus to reforms in the government sector. The 
focus is on a distinctive way of creating new urban administrative units in China - 
upgrading counties to county-level cities. By awarding the title of city to existing 
counties, upgrading has created more than 400 new cities from 1983 to 1997. During 
upgrading, local government gets many benefits, including political privileges, 
administrative independence and revenue collection power.  
Chapter 3 studies the determinants of upgrading. The main idea is that upgrading 
serves as a mechanism of providing incentives to local governments. Using data from 
1994 to 2004, I find that a county’s economic growth rate plays a key role in 
obtaining city status. I then conduct an empirical test to distinguish between a 
principal-agent incentive mechanism and political bargaining. The findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the central government uses upgrading to reward 
local officials for high growth, as well as aligning local interests with those of the 
center.  
Chapter 4 examines the consequences of upgrading. I merge data from the local 
public finance statistics with the population census and get a rich set of economic, 
fiscal and public services outcome variables. My finding confirms that city status 
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increases government size and revenues, and creates more urban employment 
opportunities. However, there is no significant improvement in local public services 
after upgrading, and the high economic growth rates in pre-upgrading period drop to a 
normal level after upgrading. These results are interpreted by analyzing the incentive 
structure of local government officials. 
The findings of the last two chapters highlight the key role of fiscal and political 
incentives facing local governments in China. The comparison between incentive and 
bargaining mechanisms sheds light on an important question about China’s politics of 
governance: where does power lie in China? 
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Chapter 2: Employment Burden, Government Ownership and 







There are two competing theories of soft budget constraint (SBC), namely the 
ownership hypothesis and the policy burden hypothesis. While the ownership 
hypothesis attributes the SBC problem to government ownership, the policy burden 
hypothesis predicts that privatization would not eliminate the SBC problem, as long 
as the major policy burden – maintaining employment – is not removed from 
enterprises. Using a panel dataset from a survey of Chinese enterprises, I conduct 
empirical tests on these two competing hypotheses. I explicitly address the 
endogeneity problems by using instruments, as well as estimating a two-step tobit 
model to improve the functional form for corner solution outcomes. The test results 
support the policy burden hypothesis but not the ownership hypothesis. My finding 
emphasizes the importance of creating a sound social security system in the process 
of China’s enterprise reform. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Although the soft budget constraint (SBC) has been discussed widely in the 
literature since Kornai’s seminal work (Kornai, 1980), there exists no consensus on 
which factors are responsible for the prevalence of soft budgets in the enterprises of 
transition countries (Anderson et al., 2000; Kornai et al. 2003; Lin and Li, 2006). This 
paper tests two competing theories of the SBC using firm-level data from China. 
These two theories are the ownership hypothesis and the policy burden hypothesis.  
According to the policy burden hypothesis (Lin et al., 1998), various policy 
burdens, as legacies of pre-reform policies, are the causal factors of soft budgets in 
China’s State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Among these policy burdens, the most 
critical one is the employment burden. Before the economic reform, due to the lack of 
a social security system, SOEs played the role of providing social welfare to all 
workers. During the reform era, under pressure from the government, SOEs continue 
to offer pensions to retired workers and provide jobs for redundant workers. Retired 
and redundant workers pose a heavy burden and cause losses to enterprises. 
Informational asymmetries make it hard to distinguish between the losses due to this 
employment burden and the SOEs’ own operational losses. As a result, government at 
different levels has to take measures to bear the losses, thus softening the budget 
constraints of those SOEs. Moreover, privatized enterprises may also bear such an 
employment burden due to government influence, thus they may also have soft 
budgets. 
In contrast, the ownership hypothesis attributes the SBC problem to an 
enterprise’s ownership type, claiming that government ownership is the causal factor 
of soft budgets (Li, 1992). Since the SBC was first analyzed as a phenomenon of 
socialist economies, many theoretical models are built with an implicit assumption of 
state ownership, thus failing to differentiate the policy burden as a separate reason for 
soft budgets. Since we usually observe state ownership and soft budgets together in 
many firms, it is no surprise to find a positive correlation between them. However, in 
order to conclude that there exists a causal relationship, one needs to control for 
factors that could also affect soft budgets, as well as to deal with possible endogeneity 
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problems. Otherwise, the correlation may be purely due to omitted variables, such as 
the unobserved quality of firms.  
In order to conduct tests on these two theories, variation of ownership and the 
employment burden is needed. Before 1995, there was little change to SOEs’ 
ownership. Moreover, the reforms relevant to the employment decisions in SOEs 
remained very limited in scope (Bodmer, 2002). It was not until 1995 that radical 
forms of enterprise restructuring took place under the policy of “grasping the large 
and letting go the small” (zhuada fangxiao). Since then, many enterprises introduced 
private shares and started to lay off large numbers of workers. The Chinese word 
“gaizhi” is used to denote such radical enterprise reforms.1 Many SOEs went through 
gaizhi during the sample period of 1995-2001, thus creating sufficient variation in 
ownership and employment burden to conduct meaningful tests. 
In my regressions, I include measures of both the employment burden and 
ownership on the right-hand side to estimate their effects on the soft budgets. This 
allows me to identify which one is the causal factor of soft budgets and to distinguish 
one hypothesis from the other. To handle the endogeneity problem of ownership and 
employment burden, I use a set of instruments that reflect the exogenous variation of 
privatization and employment policies. Since the dependent variable (measure of the 
soft budgets) equals zero in many cases, a two-step tobit model is adopted as 
improving functional form for corner solution outcomes. My test results generally 
support the policy burden hypothesis but not the ownership hypothesis. I also find 
that different measures of soft budgets respond in different ways to changes in the 
employment burden. These results are explained by analyzing the different incentives 
faced by the local and central government. Finally, I conduct several robustness tests. 
The relationship among the employment burden, privatization and the SBC in 
China has attracted a lot of attention in recent years. Some researchers look at the 
determinants of privatization, such as Guo and Yao (2005), Bai et al. (2005) and 
Brandt et al. (2005); others investigate the causes of employment adjustment in SOEs 
(Dong and Putterman, 2003) or in the public sector (Dong and Xu, 2006). However, 
                                                 
1 Literally, gaizhi means transformation of (ownership) system; practically, gaizhi includes many types of reform, 
not all of which contain privatization. For detailed description of gaizhi in China, see Garnaut et al. (2004). 
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these papers do not answer the question “what is the causal factor of the soft budgets”. 
For example, Dong and Putterman (2003) summarize that “overstaffing of SOEs has 
been commonly understood as a by-product of soft budget constraints”. In other 
words, they assume the soft budgets to be the reason for employment redundancy. 
Thus, they neglect the fact that the existence of any soft budgets cannot be taken as 
exogenous and needs to be explained. Bai et al. (2005) raise the question of whether 
stability concerns are at the root of the soft budgets, but do not provide an answer. 
Thus, the determinants of soft budgets in Chinese enterprises remain an unsolved 
question. 
Among studies that investigate the causal factors of soft budgets, Anderson et al. 
(2000) survey Mongolian enterprises and show that government ownership, 
especially central government ownership, leads to soft budgets. Frydman et al. (2000) 
look at central and eastern European firms and conclude that privatization is 
necessary to harden budget constraints. These two papers, like most others, do not 
examine the policy burden issue.2 Although Li and Liang (1998) estimate the effect of 
redundant employment on soft budgets, they do not answer whether it is the ultimate 
causal factor of the SBC problem. Luo (2005) examines the effect of privatization on 
the hardening of budget constraints but does not analyze the policy burden hypothesis 
as a competing theory. In fact, studies discussing the policy burden hypothesis are 
rare. The two exceptions are Lin and Li (2006) and Gu and Zhang (2006), who use 
theoretical models to demonstrate that policy burdens lead to or intensifies SBC 
problem. To the best of my knowledge, the only paper that directly tests the policy 
burden hypothesis is Lin et al. (2003). They use industry-level data and get results 
that are consistent with the policy burden hypothesis. Compared to these studies, this 
paper contributes to the empirical SBC literature by explicitly testing the policy 
burden hypothesis against the ownership hypotheses using firm-level data that covers 
a period when Chinese firms experienced great changes in both ownership and 
employment.  
                                                 
2 See Djankov and Murrell (2002) for a broad survey of the empirical SBC literature. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the hypothesis 
and measurement issues, and then lays out the empirical model. Section 2.3 
introduces the survey and describes the data. Section 2.4 discusses econometric 
problems. Section 2.5 presents the main results, followed by interpretation and 
robustness tests. Section 2.6 briefly concludes the paper. 
2.2 The policy burden hypothesis and the empirical model  
2.2.1 The employment burden in China’s SOEs  
The issue of the employment burden has a special importance in China, 
predominantly because of the central government’s great concern over social stability. 
Without a well-functioning social security system, the Chinese government has had to 
rely on SOEs to provide social welfare in both pre- and post-reform periods. While 
the ostensible objective of enterprise reforms is to improve the financial performance 
of SOEs through market discipline, the state has been hesitant to relieve SOEs of their 
traditional roles as guarantors of job security and welfare of their employees (Dong 
and Putterman, 2003). Maintaining high employment in the state sector has always 
been the major concern of the central government during the entire reform era, 
including the late 1990s. In an important speech in 1997, Vice Premier Zhu Rongji 
stressed that the problem of excessive workers in SOEs should not be resolved 
through massive layoffs (Bai et al., 2000). Thus, it is no surprise to see that many 
SOEs bear heavy employment burdens under pressure from different levels of 
government.  
The employment burden comes from both retired and non-retired employees. 
According to the China Statistical Yearbooks, the ratio of retired to on-duty SOE 
employees rose rapidly from 1:26 in 1978 to 1:4.6 in 1995. The accumulation of large 
amounts of retirees poses a great burden to the enterprises in terms of pensions, 
housing, medical care and other needs (Lin et al., 1998). This was true even in the late 
1990s, when the pensions of legally retired workers started to be paid out of the social 
security account, because retirees still receive other forms of welfare compensation 
from their affiliated enterprises. Also, many non-retired workers are made redundant 
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in the form of xiagang and internal retirement. Xiagang represents a type of interim 
unemployment whereby a worker stops working but still keeps a nominal tie with the 
enterprise through work registration. Xiagang workers receive a living allowance 
from the re-employment center of their SOE for three years or until they are re-
employed. Internally retired workers are those that take an early retirement but 
continue to receive a wage from the enterprise (typically at a lower rate) until they 
reach the legal retirement age.  
The magnitude of redundant labor is substantial. A director of the social security 
department in the Ministry of Labor once said “… about 20 percent of the workers 
and employees in SOEs are surplus labor” (Broadman, 1995). Using a panel dataset 
of Chinese provinces from 1986 to 1996, Li and Xu (2002) find that if all redundant 
workers were to be released out of the enterprises, the average urban unemployment 
rate could reach as high as 25%. In a survey of 769 SOEs, Bodmer (2002) finds that 
83% of SOEs report excess employment labor in 1994, and the actual number of 
workers employed exceeds the desired level by around 20%. Using another survey of 
700 SOEs, Dong and Putterman (2003) show that the mean labor redundancy rate has 
increased from 28.6% in 1991 to 44.4% in 1994. Overall, these studies suggest that 
the redundancy rate in Chinese SOEs was at least 20% in the mid-1990s before gaizhi 
began. 
2.2.2 The policy burden hypothesis 
As Kornai et al. (2003) have pointed out, the early SBC literature examines 
almost exclusively enterprises under state ownership. The consequence is too much 
attention on firms’ government ownership and not enough attention on other 
important factors. This has been changed in the recent literature. For example, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) discuss politicians’ influence on enterprises’ employment 
and production decisions. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) relate the SBC problem 
with the creditor’s lack of information and commitment, and therefore break the 
specific relationship between the soft budgets and the socialist system. Bai and Wang 
(1998) bring the politicians’ influence and information asymmetry together and 
emphasize the agency problem of the bureaucrats.  
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The policy burden theory inherits the information perspective of these theories, 
and is based upon the moral hazard problem involving the enterprise manager’s 
behavior (Lin and Li, 2006). Various policy burdens put SOEs in a disadvantaged 
situation in competition with non-state enterprises. As long as there is a policy burden 
on an enterprise, the government has to assist it at times of difficulty. In theory, the 
government should be responsible only for the losses arising from policy burdens. 
However, due to information asymmetries, managers have an incentive to attribute all 
their losses to policy burdens, and the government is not able to distinguish whether 
the losses are due to policy burdens or caused by operational failures. Thus the 
government has to bear all the losses by providing subsidies, cutting taxes or offering 
other forms of compensations to those enterprises in difficulty (Lin et al., 1998; Lin 
and Tan, 1999). These compensations will soften the budget constraint of SOEs (or 
any enterprises that bear policy burdens and receive aids). The major policy burdens 
include the employment burden, the strategic burden and price distortions. In this 
paper, I focus exclusively on the employment burden. The causal effect of the 
employment burden means that at least some kinds of policy burdens are responsible 
for soft budgets, thus the positive results of a link between the employment burden 
and soft budgets could be interpreted as supporting the policy burden hypothesis. 
Since the ownership hypothesis does not exclude the employment consideration 
of the government, people might ask “what is the difference between these two 
theories?” According to the policy burden hypothesis, privatization will not eliminate 
soft budgets if the burdens are not removed, because government ownership is not the 
ultimate determinant for soft budgets. In fact, as long as any enterprise still bears 
burdens such as maintaining employment, soft budgets will continue to exist 
regardless of its ownership type. This stands in contrast to the prediction of the 
ownership hypothesis.  
This point has also been made in other studies. Kornai et al. (2003) mention that 
“it is not rare for firms in private ownership to be rescued from financial straits; this 
has been particularly evident in post-socialist transition where privatization has by no 
means ended the practice of bailouts.” According to the World Bank (2002), many 
firms in Eastern Europe actually received more government subsidies after 
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privatization than before. In China, as I will demonstrate later, employment burdens 
have remained prevalent even after gaizhi. Thus, I would expect to see that soft 
budgets continue to exist, if the policy burden hypothesis holds.  
To test these two hypotheses, I include measures of both the employment burden 
and ownership as independent variables in the regression.  This allows me to identify 
which factor is responsible for soft budgets and to distinguish one hypothesis from 
the other. If the policy burden hypothesis holds, there should be a positive effect of 
employment burden on soft budgets, while private ownership should not make much 
difference from government ownership. Alternatively, if the ownership hypothesis 
holds, we should find a positive effect of state ownership but not employment burden. 
2.2.3 Measurement of soft budgets and the employment burden 
As stated in Kornai et al. (2003), there are various means of softening an 
enterprise’s budget constraint. Accordingly, soft budgets can take different forms, 
such as soft subsidies, soft taxes, soft credit and soft administrative pricing (Sjoberg 
and Gang, 1996). Since I do not have information on managers’ expectation of being 
bailed out (Anderson et al., 2000), I use four different forms of aids received by firms 
to measure soft budgets. These measures cover various means of “softness” 
mentioned in the literature. In particular, I have one variable to measure soft budgets 
from banks and three variables to measure soft budgets from the government. 
Following Garnaut et al. (2005), overdue bank debts, which equal to the sum of 
overdue loans and overdue interest payment, are used to measure the bank soft budget. 
I have three variables to measure soft budgets from governments: government 
subsidies, soft taxes (overdue taxes plus tax exemptions) and overdue social security 
payments. While government subsidies are a direct measure of aid from the 
government, the other three measures capture the idea that the government or banks 
impose weak financial or fiscal discipline on firms and allow the extension of 
overdue payments. These measures also distinguish between “stocks” (such as 
overdue bank debts) and “flows” (such as government subsidies). Thus, they satisfy 
the standards set by Schaffer (1998), who emphasizes the importance of “actually 
receiving net financing” as evidence of soft budgets. In sum, the measures of soft 
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budgets include overdue bank debts, government subsidies, soft taxes and overdue 
social security payments. They satisfy my requirements and are consistent with the 
literature (see summary in Table 1 of Kornai et al. 2003). To make these variables 
comparable across enterprises with different sizes, I normalize them by the total 
assets of each enterprise.  
To measure the employment burden, I use two variables that capture different 
sides of the employment adjustment story. In one case, I use the redundancy rate to 
measure the direct burden from redundant workers, which are defined as the sum of 
xiagang, internally retired and retired workers. These workers make no contribution 
to their affiliated enterprises, but they are still partly supported by those enterprises 
and therefore become a “burden” (Song and Yao, 2004). The redundancy rate is 
defined as the ratio of redundant workers to total workers of that firm. In the other 
case, I use the layoff rate to measure the reduction of the employment burden. Instead 
of keeping redundant workers in the firm, laying them off alleviates the firm’s 
employment burden. Thus, the layoff rate and the redundancy rate have opposite 
meanings. Here the layoff rate is defined as the number of workers being laid off 
divided by number of total workers plus the number of workers being laid off in that 
year. The reason for including the number of workers being laid off in the 
denominator is to keep the layoff rate between zero and one, given that some 
enterprises discharge most of their workers in a single year. In sum, a heavier 
employment burden implies a higher redundancy rate and a lower layoff rate. The 
effect of the redundancy rate on soft budgets should be positive while that of layoff 
rate should be negative, if the policy burden hypothesis holds. 
2.2.4 Empirical model  
The empirical model is 1 2 3it t it it it itY G Z X eα β β β′ ′ ′= + + + + . For firm i in year t, 
Yit, Git and Zit represent the soft budgets, ownership and employment burdens, 
respectively. Year dummies (αt) are used to capture the impact of nation-wide policy 
changes. Other variables (Xit) are included to control for factors that may have an 
impact on the soft budget, such as enterprise size and performance. Finally, eit 
represents the error term. I add a full set of city dummies in the regression to control 
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for city-level policies and market conditions that may affect soft budgets. This 
method is consistent with other studies that use the same data, such as Guo and Yao 
(2005). Although controlling for firm fixed-effects could help to address the omitted 
variable problem, I choose not to control for them because I want to fully utilize the 
between-firm variation. The ownership and control variables are measured in the 
following way. 
Ownership dummy G: As described in the introduction section, gaizhi takes many 
different forms, not all of which involve privatization. For example, a firm could be 
internally restructured without transfer of ownership from the state to private hands. 
Internal restructuring further include several forms, such as incorporation, spin-off 
and debt-equity swaps. Even in cases where private shares are introduced, the 
government may still keep controlling shares in that firm. Thus I distinguish between 
three different types of ownership. A state controlled firm is one where different 
levels of government or SOEs hold more than half but not all of its shares. This type 
of firm is also called partial SOEs. 3 A privately controlled firm, by contrast, is one 
where private or foreign firms control at least half the shares. The third type is a fully 
state owned enterprise, which serves as the omitted group in the regression.  
Control variables X: Firm performance and firm size are likely to affect soft 
budgets, in ways that have nothing to do with the employment burden or ownership 
type. For example, if a firm is making a large profit, its overdue bank debts are 
unlikely to be extended, regardless of how much employment burden it bears. On the 
other hand, the chance for a very large firm to receive subsidies at a time of difficulty 
may be much higher than that of a small firm, because the government fears the 
negative spillover effects of the large firm’s possible bankruptcy. This is usually 
called “too big to fail” in the literature. Thus I want to control for the performance 
and size of firms in the regression. Since the dependent variable is defined by either 
overdue bank debts, government subsidies, soft taxes or overdue social security 
payments divided by total assets, I should not use “total assets” as a control for size 
on the right-hand side; otherwise this built-in negative correlation would induce bias 
in my estimates. Therefore, I use the total number of workers as a size control (with a 
                                                 
3 See Sun et al. (2005) for a theory of optimal state share in partial SOEs. 
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log transformation to reduce the effect of outliers). The variable used to control for 
performance is the one-year lagged sales per worker, which is defined as total sales 
divided by the number of on-duty workers.  
2.3 Data 
The data comes from an International Finance Corporation survey conducted in 
11 Chinese cities in 2002. The survey was administered by the State Economic and 
Trade Commission (SETC) and its counterparts in the sample cities. The surveyed 
enterprises are industrial firms that were owned by the municipal government of the 
11 cities at the end of 1995. These cities are Harbin, Fushun, Tangshan, Lanzhou, 
Weifang, Xining, Zhenjiang, Huangshi, Chengdu, Hengyang, and Guiyang. Their 
locations, GDP levels and other economic conditions varied dramatically, allowing 
researchers to account for the significant regional variation of enterprise reforms in 
terms of form, pace and outcome. About 1,100 questionnaires were sent out, with 683 
questionnaires collected. The survey questionnaires cover basic enterprise 
information, as well as detailed information about gaizhi. Moreover, the financial 
information, employment condition and share structure data is recorded annually 
from 1995 to 2001.  
Most of the sample firms were in manufacturing sectors, especially in machinery 
(14%), petro-chemicals (13%) and textiles (10%). This is roughly consistent with the 
sector distribution at the national level. In terms of employment size, the sample is 
over-represented by large firms, with an average of 864 workers, which is about 4 
times of the national average. With regard to the pace of gaizhi, 54% of the SOEs in 
the sample reported that they had undertaken gaizhi by the end of 2002, while about 
86% of the China’s SOEs had finished gaizhi by the end of 2001 (Garnaut et al., 
2005). The over-representation by larger firms with slower paced gaizhi in the sample 
is probably due to the fact that the survey was conducted by the SETC, so that larger 
and non-private firms tend to have a higher response rate. However, this should not 
pose a problem to my empirical tests because the variation in the employment burden 
and ownership is nonetheless quite substantial. For example, the share of state 
controlled firms is 2.1% in 1995 and 8.4% in 2001, while the share of privately 
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controlled firms rises from 0.7% in 1995 to 12.1% in 2001. In sum, the survey 
generates a sample that is appropriate for my testing purpose. 4 
In the sample, most firms have 7 years of observation. However, the panel dataset 
is unbalanced since some firms have a shorter life span due to a merger or a split. 
Table 1 shows the definition and summary statistics of variables. In addition to the 
total number of observations, mean and standard deviation, I also list the number of 
observations that take the value of zero and the mean value in 1995 and 2001. It is 
easy to see that the mean redundancy rate (41%) in my sample is comparable to other 
studies listed in section 2.2.1. Despite the high redundancy rate, the layoff rate 
remained at a very low level until 2001. The four measures of soft budgets, 
redundancy rates and layoff rates all increased while employment size decreased 
during the sample period. 
2.4 Econometric problems 
There are two major econometric problems that need to be addressed before I start 
to run regressions. The first one is the endogeneity issue. On the one hand, ownership 
is often viewed as endogenous in the empirical literature due to either omitted-
variable bias or reverse causality (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). On the other hand, 
both the redundancy rate and the layoff rate could be affected by the inherent quality 
of a firm, which is not fully captured by the performance control. 5 The inherent 
quality could affect the firm’s arrears to banks and the government, and therefore 
make the estimates biased. For example, a firm with poor inherent quality usually has 
a high redundancy rate and a high layoff rate together, and owes a lot of arrears as 
well. In that case, the coefficients on the redundancy rate and layoff rate would both 
be positive for reasons that have nothing to do with the employment burden. Thus we 
could reject the policy burden hypothesis just because of the omitted-variable bias. To 
solve these endogeneity problems, I use instrumental variables (IVs) that capture the 
exogenous changes in ownership, the redundancy rate and the layoff rate. I estimate 
the model using a two-stage least square (2SLS) method. 
                                                 
4 For more details about this survey, see Garnaut et al. (2005). 
5 For more details on the inherent quality hypothesis, see Li and Rozelle (2004). 
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The first instrument is a dummy variable that measures the manager’s importance 
in the firm’s employment decision. It equals one if the manager self-reports that he or 
she has a decisive influence on employment issue relative to other related parties of 
the firm, and equals zero otherwise.6 Obviously, the manager’s influence will directly 
affect the redundancy and layoff rate of a firm. Also, such influence is only inside the 
firm, and is unlikely to be directly causally related to the soft budgets. Moreover, a 
manager’s influence largely depends on personal characteristics, and it is not likely to 
be reversely affected by ownership type. Therefore, this first instrument is validly 
excluded from the main equation. The second instrument is the age of the firm. Under 
the slogan “grasping the large and letting go the small” the central government 
adopted different reform policies for enterprises with different sizes that were 
historically determined (Xu et al., 2005). Also, the number of retired workers is 
usually positively correlated with the age of a firm. Thus the firm size and firm age 
provide important identification information for gaizhi and the employment condition. 
Since firm size has been used as a control variable, here only firm age is adopted as 
an instrument. As managerial and political turnover became more common in the 
reform era, old SOEs lost their close ties with government officials, so that the direct 
correlation between firm age and soft budgets is weak.  Firm age thus serves as a 
valid instrument. I calculate each firm’s age at 2002. The mean is 33 years, and the 
maximum is 124 years. Similar to the employment size, a log transformation is 
applied to this variable to reduce effect of outliers. 
Besides these two variables, I include a set of region-sector interaction dummies 
as additional instruments.  Since there exist specified labor markets for different 
sectors in different cities (e.g., the job market for textile workers in Harbin city), the 
demand and supply in these labor markets will have an impact on firms’ redundancy 
and layoff rate. More importantly, what these interaction dummies actually capture 
are the characteristics of the specified labor markets, not those of cities or industries. 
Therefore, they are not likely to be directly correlated with soft budgets and these 
interaction dummies are excluded from the main equation. To limit the number of 
                                                 
6 These different parties include government, board of directors, labor union, shareholder conference, communist 
party branch, supervision board and parent company. 
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instruments, I combine the city dummies into 2 regional dummies: south and north. 
The northern cities include Harbin, Fushun, Tangshan, Xining, Weifang and Lanzhou, 
and the remaining cities belong to the south. The 2-digit coded industries are 
combined into 3 major sectors: mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and other 
sectors, which include utility supply, transportation, trade services etc. In total, I have 
6 region-sector interaction dummies. As will be shown in section 2.5, these 
interaction dummies survive the over-identification test after I control for city and 
sector dummies in the main equation. This gives further justification regarding their 
validity as instruments. 
The second econometric problem lies in the fact that the dependent variables 
equal zero in many cases. For example, of the total 2949 observations of overdue 
bank debts shown in Table 1, 1207 cases equal zero. These zeros could be viewed as 
corner solution outcomes, which generate censored data. Thus I adopt a tobit model.  
I assume that the latent amount of soft budgets is 1 2 3*it t it it it itY G Z X eα β β β′ ′ ′= + + + +  
and we observe Yit = max(0, Yit*). That is, the latent amount of soft budgets Yit* is 
determined by the firm’s ownership, employment condition and other characteristics 
including performance. In case Yit*>0, subsidies (or other kinds of aid) will be given 
accordingly; if Yit*≤ 0, the government will simply not compensate the firm, instead 
of making a “negative” subsidy.  
Addressing the endogeneity problem and accommodating corner solution 
outcomes simultaneously, I estimate a two-step tobit model with endogenous 
regressors (Newey, 1987). I will present the two-step tobit results along with those 
from 2SLS estimation. Furthermore, given the tobit model’s limitation of using a 
single mechanism to determine the choice between Y = 0 versus Y > 0 and the value 
of Y conditional on Y > 0, I estimate a simple two-tiered model as a robustness test.7 
If there does exist two different mechanisms, the estimates would allow me to check 
whether the effect of the employment burden on soft budgets is consistent in these 
two mechanisms.  
                                                 
7 See chapter 16.7 of Wooldridge (2002) for more details. 
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2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 First-stage results 
Table 2 shows the first-stage regression results.8 The F-statistics are generally 
high and the corresponding p-values are all smaller than 0.002. This demonstrates that 
these instruments are generally powerful in the first-stage.  
The first-stage regressions display some interesting patterns regarding the 
employment adjustment and gaizhi at the firm level. For the first instrument, if the 
enterprise manager has a decisive influence on employment, more workers are likely 
to be put on redundancy, but the layoff rate is not significantly affected. This result 
demonstrates that the scope of managers’ employment decision is quite limited: they 
generally do not have the ability to fire non-productive workers. 9  Nonetheless, 
managers could make non-productive workers redundant, by means of xiagang or 
internal retirement, possibly with efficiency in mind. 
For the second instrument, firm age, the regression shows that older firms are 
more likely to have a higher redundancy rate and a higher layoff rate. Besides this, 
older firms are less likely to be partial SOEs as opposed to remaining fully owned by 
the state. However, being older does not prevent a firm from undergoing privatization. 
In Table 2, I also present the coefficients on the region-sector interaction 
dummies by taking the mining and quarrying industries in the south as the omitted 
group. The first interesting finding is that firms located in northern cities generally 
have a higher redundancy rate, and are less likely to be privatized. These results are 
consistent with the observation that firms in northern China have heavier employment 
burdens and a slower reform pace, due to the concentration of heavy industries. 
Another interesting point is that the layoff rate in “other” sectors in the south is 
significantly low relative to manufacturing, mining and quarrying sectors in the south 
and all sectors in northern cities. This finding is also consistent with the economic 
                                                 
8 Different measures of soft budgets correspond to different sample sizes, so the number of observations of first-
stage varies. Table 2 shows results based on the sample size of overdue bank debts. The first-stage results based on 
other sample size are very similar to table 2. 
9 This is consistent with Dong and Putterman (2003), who claim that managers of SOEs were unable to adjust the 
size of their labor forces in response to changes in demand and technology up until the late 1990s. 
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prosperity and increasing demand for various business services in southern China, 
which makes these “other” sectors perform relatively well in terms of job creation. 
2.5.2 Main results 
The main regression results are shown in Table 3. The dependent variables are the 
measures of soft budgets: overdue bank debts, government subsidies, overdue social 
security payments and soft taxes (all normalized by total assets). For each dependent 
variable, I first show the ordinary least square (OLS) results, then the results for 2SLS 
and two-step tobit models. Independent variables include employment burden 
measures, ownership dummies, control variables and a full set of year and city 
dummies. As expected, the coefficient on one-year lagged sales per worker is 
generally negative, which means that firms tend to have softer budgets if their 
performance is bad. One interesting finding about firm size is that the coefficient on 
log (total workers) is negative and significant in most cases. This contradicts the 
common view that larger firms have better access to government aid under the logic 
of “too big to fail”, thus inspiring us to look for deeper reasons for soft budgets. 
I conduct Hausman tests to compare the coefficient on layoff rate between the 
OLS and 2SLS models. The test results (not shown in the table) suggest that these 
coefficients are significantly different in most specifications (except when the 
dependent variable is government subsidies) and support the use of the instruments. 
One example is the comparison between column 1 and column 2. By using 2SLS 
instead of OLS, the coefficient on the layoff rate changes from positive to negative. 
This demonstrates that instruments are necessary in order to solve the omitted-
variable problem, possibly caused by an unobserved inherent quality. In addition, I 
test the over-identification restrictions for the 2SLS models. The null hypothesis is 
that, if at least one instrument is valid, all instruments are jointly valid. Table 3 shows 
that the p-values of the Sargan statistics of the over-identification tests are generally 
high, suggesting that we cannot reject the null. In sum, the test results provide some 
evidence on the validity of my instruments. 
The results shown in Table 3 generally support the policy burden hypothesis. A 
higher redundancy rate or a lower layoff rate is associated with a softer bank budget 
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constraint and a softer government budget constraint as well (except for soft taxes, 
which will be discussed in the next sub-section). According to the 2SLS results, a one 
percentage point decrease in layoff rate from the mean (1.1%) corresponds to an 8.9 
percentage points increase in overdue bank debts (mean is 32%) and an 1.01 
percentage points higher overdue social security payments to the government (mean 
is 2.8%). A ten percentage points increase in redundancy rate from the mean (41%) 
corresponds to 16.9 percentage points higher overdue bank debts. The coefficients on 
the layoff rate and redundancy rate in the two-step tobit regressions are generally 
bigger than 2SLS estimates in absolute value. However, what they represent is the 
marginal effect on the “latent” outcome. Their corresponding marginal effects on 
“observed” outcome are usually smaller, and are roughly comparable to the 2SLS 
results.10 Overall, the estimated economic effects are substantial.  
In contrast, the results in Table 3 do not support the ownership hypothesis. The 
coefficient on the privately controlled dummy is generally negative, but not 
statistically significant in most specifications. This means that privately controlled 
firms are not substantially different from fully state owned firms in receiving various 
kinds of soft budgets. On the other hand, the coefficient on the state controlled 
dummy is significantly positive in several specifications, suggesting that partial SOEs 
have higher overdue bank debts and receive more subsidies from the government than 
fully state owned firms. The reason may lie in the nature of their partial state 
ownership. During gaizhi, the government usually introduces some private shares into, 
but nonetheless keeps controlling shares in, enterprises that have special importance 
(Sun et al., 2006). As a result, the controlling state ownership may actually represent 
strong bargaining power or close ties with the government, thus allowing these firms 
to get more help than fully state owned ones in general. In particular, let us look at the 
example of overdue social security payments. In 1998, China introduced a social 
security system that requires firms to pay around 20% of their payroll into social 
security funds which are then pooled together at the city level and ultimately at the 
                                                 
10Theoretically, these marginal effects could be manually calculated by multiplying the two-step tobit estimates by 
an adjustment factor. However, the two-step estimator does not identify the adjustment factor computationally, so I 
am not able to calculate the exact amount of the marginal effects. See chapter 16.2 of Wooldridge (2002) for 
details. 
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national level. The high payments and the requirement of fund-pooling might have 
induced some firms to default on their payments, especially those with strong 
bargaining power. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that these state controlled 
firms owe more social security payments relative to other types of firms. 
2.5.3 Soft taxes and incentives of the local and central governments 
Regressions on soft taxes (Table 3, columns 10-12) appear to be abnormal. Of all 
the employment burden and ownership variables, only the layoff rate has a significant 
effect; and it is in an unexpected way: a higher layoff rate is associated with more soft 
taxes. Except this, soft taxes are unresponsive to both the redundancy rate and 
ownership type. This finding is consistent with the findings in Table 6 and 9 of Luo 
(2005). So why is there such a big difference between soft taxes and other forms of 
soft budgets?  
Different sources of soft budgets correspond to government at different levels, 
and these different levels of government may have divergent incentives. To 
understand the difference between soft taxes and other forms of soft budgets, and 
more generally, to analyze the link between the employment burden and soft budgets, 
one needs to examine the incentives of different levels of government and their 
impact on soft budgets. This idea is consistent with Anderson et al. (2000), who 
suggest that “analysis of enterprise-state relations in transition countries offers 
considerable potential for identifying the determinants of soft budgets”. The main 
source of industrial enterprise loans comes from the four major State Owned 
Commercial Banks (SOBs), while various kinds of government soft budgets are 
mainly related to city governments in my sample. Next I will discuss the fiscal 
incentives and role of city-level governments, and then move to the central 
government and the SOBs. 
As the representative of “local government” in the paper,11 city governments play 
a mixed role in relation to enterprises. First, city governments are responsible for 
social stability. Since social stability is a crucial component in China’s cadre 
                                                 
11 Provincial government lies between the city government and the central government. Since it does not directly 
own SOEs in my sample, I will not discuss them here. 
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evaluation system (sometimes even with a “veto” power), there is an incentive for 
city governments to help enterprises that bear a heavy employment burden. Second, 
city governments are the direct owner of most enterprises in my sample. The 
performance of these SOEs will also have an important effect on the promotion of 
city officials (Li and Zhou, 2005). Thus city officials are concerned with the 
profitability of these city-owned SOEs, and may take relatively long-term views 
about firms’ financial difficulty, instead of simply bailing them out just because they 
are owned by city governments. Third, as the tax collector and public service provider, 
city governments need tax revenues from those enterprises. This role gives city 
governments an incentive to enforce tax rules. Jin et al.’s (2005) finding of stronger 
fiscal incentives of local governments in the reform era supports this argument.12 
Thus, I expect that the budget on tax payment to be much harder than that on social 
security payments. Compared to other forms of government soft budgets, soft taxes 
should be less responsive to changes in employment burden or ownership. My 
regression results confirm that neither the redundancy rate nor ownership plays an 
important role in determining city governments’ tax enforcement. In sum, the mixed 
role of city governments do not support the ownership hypothesis, while fiscal 
incentives may harden enterprises’ budget in regard to tax payment.  
Although aware of the SBC problem, policy makers at the central level usually 
choose to first deal with the most urgent concerns. Bai et al. (2005) argue that the 
central government places more weight on social stability than the local government. 
Therefore, in short term, the central government may put pressure on both city 
governments and the SOBs to let them support enterprises that bear an employment 
burden. For the SOBs’ city branches, although they report directly to higher-level 
managers, there is evidence that they were still subject to the influence of city 
governments throughout the 1990s. For example, Wei and Wang (1997) find 
evidence that the loans of China’s SOBs favor SOEs in the early 1990s, while Cull 
and Xu (2003) find that the association between bank finance and profitability 
                                                 
12 The tax reform of 1994 introduced a clear distinction between national and local taxes. The major tax levied on 
city-owned SOEs, the value-added tax, is shared by central and local government. Another important tax, business 
tax, which is mainly for the service sectors, is collected by local government. Thus the fiscal incentive argument 
for city government is still valid after the 1994 tax reform. 
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weakened in the 1990s as banks increasingly assumed bailout responsibility. Thus, 
under the pressure of central government and the influence of city governments, 
SOBs would have had a bad discipline with respect to loans and interest payments, 
sometimes by simply writing off arrears. The reason to do such bailout is to let firms 
take employment burdens, especially when the unemployment concern rises with 
gaizhi. The empirical results shown above are consistent with this argument.  
In sum, the concern over social stability gives both the city and central 
government an incentive to take actions that could soften the budget constraints of 
firms. However, soft taxes are less responsive due to the fiscal incentives of city 
governments. The difference between soft taxes and other means of soft budgets 
reflects the mixed role of city governments.  
2.5.4 Robustness tests 
I conducted several robustness tests to make sure that my main results still hold in 
alternative model specifications (Table 4). First, it may be argued that current soft 
budgets may actually depend on the employment burden that had already been taken 
by firms in the past. So I try the specification with the one-year lagged layoff rate and 
redundancy rate as independent variables. Also, I control for the one-year lagged log 
of total workers. The results for overdue bank debts are shown in columns 1 and 2. A 
higher redundancy rate or a lower layoff rate is associated with more overdue bank 
debts, but ownership dummies are not significant. The economic effect of the one-
year lagged layoff rate is even stronger than the current-year value. This suggests that 
the employment burden may have a continuous effect on soft budgets for several 
years. 
Second, the mechanism determining whether or not the enterprise is subject to 
soft budgets may be different from the one that determines the amount of soft budgets 
given that the budget constraint is soft. One limitation of the tobit model is that it 
does not distinguish between these two mechanisms. Here I conduct a two-tiered 
model (also known as hurdle model or two-part model) as an additional check. My 
goal is not to test the two-tiered model against the tobit model, but to check whether 
the sign of the effect of employment burden is consistent in these two mechanisms. I 
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take a simple approach suggested by Wooldridge (2002). I first estimate a probit 
model to explain whether or not a firm has any overdue bank debts; then I run a linear 
regression on observations that have positive overdue bank debts, so as to estimate 
the conditional effect of the employment burden. As usual, both the probit and linear 
models are estimated in a two-step way using instruments. Columns 3 and 4 show the 
results of these two estimations. While a higher redundancy rate or a lower layoff rate 
increases a firm’s chance to get any extension on bank debts, a lower layoff rate helps 
firms that already have positive overdue bank debts to increase the overdue amount. 
Thus, both mechanisms suggest a causal relationship between employment burden 
and overdue bank debts. The ownership dummies are not significant in either 
regression. 
Third, Garnaut et al. (2005) point out that whether or not the firm has new 
overdue bank debts may be a better indicator of bank soft budgets than the stock of 
past overdue debts. Following this argument, I change the dependent variable into a 
binary one, representing whether or not the enterprises have any new overdue bank 
loans in that year, and estimate a two-step probit method. The results in column 5 
show that the probability of getting new overdue bank debts is positively associated 
with the redundancy rate. Although the coefficient on the layoff rate is not significant, 
its sign is still negative. This result is consistent with the policy burden hypothesis. 
On the other hand, ownership dummies are still not significant.  
Finally, I add industry dummies in the regressions to control for any possible bias 
of soft budgets towards specific industries. The nine industry dummies include 
primary, food, textile, furniture, chemicals, metal, machinery, electronics, and service. 
The regression results for overdue bank debts, government subsidies and overdue 
social security payments in the two-step tobit model are shown in columns 6-8. These 
dummies are usually jointly significant in the regressions. We can see that the major 
results still hold. 
2.6 Conclusion 
As an important SBC theory, the policy burden hypothesis challenges the 
traditional ownership hypothesis by singling out policy burdens as the ultimate causal 
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factors of soft budgets. Taking the employment burden as an example of policy 
burdens, this paper conducts an empirical test on these two competing hypotheses 
using firm-level data from China. The results broadly support the policy burden 
hypothesis, but not the ownership hypothesis. It should be noted that both the policy 
burden theory and my empirical test are based on the Chinese experience. With 
substantial differences in institutional environment, any attempt to translate the policy 
burden theory and results to other transition countries should be done with caution. 
This paper addresses some of the important econometric issues in the transition 
literature, such as the endogeneity problem and the corner solution outcome. I 
interpret the empirical results within the Chinese institutional background by 
analyzing the incentives of the different levels of government in China. However, 
future research is needed in order to disentangle the complex relationship among the 
government’s concerns over unemployment, its privatization strategy and soft 
budgets. In this sense, more detailed data that covers a longer period would be very 
helpful. 
The SBC problem is closely related to the employment and social security issues 
in China. To solve the SBC problem and improve enterprise performance, efforts 
should be made to create jobs and improve the social safety net. The central 
government has already realized that “a sound social security system is vital for 















State controlled =1 if government share between 50% and 100%; =0 otherwise 4,408 4,188 0.050 0.20 0.021 0.084 
Privately controlled =1 if private share more than 50%; =0 otherwise 4,408 4,224 0.042 0.18  0.007 0.121 
Redundancy rate +internal retired+retired workers
total workers
xiagang 3,903 216 0.41 0.27 0.031 0.50 
Layoff rate 
laidoff workers
( total worker  laidoff workers)+
 
3,881 3,110 0.011 0.06 0.006 0.017 
Overdue bank debts overdue loans and interest 
total assets
 2,949 1,207 0.32 0.44 0.28 0.40 
Government subsidies government subsidies
total assets
 800 363 0.011 0.02 0.009 0.011 
Soft taxes overdue taxes + tax exemptions
total assets
 3,162 1,250 0.025 0.07 0.021 0.028 
Overdue social 
security payments 
overdue social security payments
total assets
 
1,361 343 0.028 0.07 0.014 0.044 
Sales per worker 
(10,000 RMB/person) 
sales
 on-duty workers 
  
3,240 N.A. 6.88 28.2 6.56 9.08 
Total workers number of total workers 4,063 N.A. 864 1388 876 813 
On-duty workers number of on-duty workers 4,014 N.A. 573 982 681 464 
Total assets  
(10,000 RMB) total assets of the firm 3,621 N.A. 5197 6355 4501 5134 
 26
 
Table 2. First-stage regression results 
Dependent variable: 
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Manager has a decisive influence 
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R-squared 0.04 0.31 0.09 0.11 
Test of excluded instruments: F-









Number of observation 1,976 1,976 1,976 1,976 
Notes: 1. All regressions include a full set of year and city dummies. 2. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis; Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are represented by *, ** and ***. 3. The null 




Table 3. Regression analysis - main results 
Dependent variable: 
Overdue bank debts Government subsidies Overdue social security payments Soft taxes  
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS  (3) 2-step 
Tobit 
(4) OLS (5) 2SLS (6) 2-step 
Tobit 
(7) OLS (8) 2SLS (9) 2-step 
Tobit 
(10) OLS (11) 2SLS (12) 2-step 
Tobit 
Employment burden              
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Over-ID test: p-value  0.34   0.77   0.86   0.05  
Number of Observation 2,210 1,976 1,976 602 562 562 1,066 970 970 2,372 2,138 2,138 
Note: 1. All regressions include a full set of year and city dummies. 2. Standard errors are in parenthesis; Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are represented by *, ** and ***. 3. Over-ID (Over- 





Table 4. Regression analysis - robustness tests 
Dependent variable: 
Overdue bank debts 1= (overdue bank debts 
>0) 






1= (new overdue bank 
debts>0) 




















Employment burden          

































(0.74)       
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Control         
Log(total workers) 
















(0.064)       
One-year lagged 

















Over-ID test: p-value 0.45   0.31     
Number of observation 1,981 1,981 1,976 1,196 2,411 1,976 562 970 
Note: 1. All regressions include a full set of year and city dummies. 2. Regressions in column 6, 7 and 8 include nine industry dummies. 3. Standard errors are in parenthesis; 
Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are represented by *, ** and ***. 4. Over- identification test is conducted for the 2SLS regressions, p-value of the Sargan statistics is 
listed. 
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This Chapter examines a distinctive mechanism of providing incentives to local 
governments – the creation of "cities". In China, awarding city status to existing 
counties was the dominant way of creating new urban administrative units, during 
which the local government gets many benefits. Using a large panel data set covering 
all counties in China during 1993-2004, I investigate the determinants of upgrading. I 
find that the official minimum requirements for upgrading are not enforced in practice. 
Instead, a county’s economic growth rate plays a key role in obtaining city status. An 
empirical test is then conducted to distinguish between a principal-agent incentive 
mechanism and political bargaining. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that the central government uses upgrading to reward local officials for high growth, 
as well as aligning local interests with those of the center. This paper highlights the 
importance of both fiscal and political incentives facing the local government. The 
comparison between incentive and bargaining mechanisms sheds light on an 




In transition and developing countries, a major concern of the central government 
is to give local governments incentives to spur market development and economic 
growth. Democracy achieves this goal by putting the local government under the 
direct pressure of citizens who vote. In contrast, under a hierarchical political system, 
the central government relies on its political authority to create incentive mechanisms. 
For example, the "Cadre Evaluation and Appointment System" is used by the Chinese 
central government to induce desirable economic outcomes (Huang, 2002; Mei, 2007). 
At the same time, fiscal decentralization provides market incentives to local 
governments by making them the residual claimant over local revenues (Montinola et 
al., 1995; Jin et al., 2005). 
This paper examines a very distinctive mechanism of providing incentives. In 
China, awarding "city" status to existing counties is the dominant way of creating 
new urban administrative units. The creation of a large number of cities through so-
called "county-to-city upgrading" has changed China’s basic administrative structure, 
making the Chinese city system unique. City status gives localities both political and 
fiscal benefits, thus providing the center with an effective tool to reward counties. I 
present evidence that the central government uses the creation of cities as part of the 
incentive system for local officials, which is very important for China’s successful 
reform (Zhuravskaya, 2000; Li and Zhou, 2005). 
By viewing county-to-city upgrading as an incentive mechanism, I cast the 
relationship between center and localities as that between principal and agents. 
However, it has been argued that the central-local relationship in China is much more 
like political bargaining (see Shirk, 1993). As local governments get more and more 
discretion through decentralization, they gradually accumulate bargaining power that 
is used to negotiate political benefits from the center. Bargaining differs from the 
incentive mechanism in that it is based on the assumption of much stronger local 
political power. Despite the great attention paid to the central-local relationship by 
both political scientists and economists, few studies have attempted to determine 
whether political bargaining or principal-agent incentive mechanisms occur. My 
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paper fills this gap by differentiating between these two mechanisms and providing 
evidence on the dominance of incentive mechanisms in China’s central-local 
relationships. 
Using a large panel data set covering all counties in China during 1993-2004, I 
show that the formal minimum requirements for county-to-city upgrading are not 
enforced in practice. Instead, economic performance has played a critical role in 
upgrading. I provide strong and robust evidence on the relationship between a 
county’s growth rate and its probability of getting city status after controlling for the 
formal requirements (industrialization, population and fiscal strength). Moreover, I 
conduct an empirical test to distinguish between the incentive mechanism and the 
bargaining mechanism. Using local extra-budgetary funds as an example of 
divergence between central and local interests, I find that city status helps the center 
to align local interests with national ones. This finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that upgrading is used as an incentive mechanism, instead of being the 
result of bargaining. 
This paper relates to the existing literature in three ways. First, it highlights the 
coexistence of fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China. This 
unique institutional setting is attracting growing interests among economists 
(Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Zhang, 2006; Zhuravskaya, 2007). While the role of 
fiscal decentralization in stimulating economic growth has been discussed extensively 
(see, e.g. Qian and Weingast, 1997; Qian and Roland, 1998; Zhang and Zou, 1998), 
some recent studies argue that the centralized power structure is also crucial in 
creating yardstick competition among local officials and constraining them from 
practicing local protectionism (Cai and Treisman, 2004; Li and Zhou, 2005; Bai et al., 
2007). Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) explicitly point out the complementarities 
between the "carrot" of fiscal revenue sharing and the "stick" of political 
centralization. In this paper, upgrading is the result of centralized decision-making; at 
the same time, it gives local officials more discretion over revenue collection. Thus, it 
reflects both political centralization and fiscal decentralization. 
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Second, since upgrading provides many benefits to local officials, it is a 
substitute for promotion. This paper thus relates to the literature on the career 
concerns and political mobility of local officials.13 Although it is generally accepted 
that ideological loyalty has become much less important in determining the 
promotion of local officials during China’s reform era, there still exists doubt 
concerning to what extent economic performance matters. For example, Landry (2003, 
p. 31) concludes that "economic performance of cities has little substantive impact on 
promotion or removal from office". Moreover, even among studies that admit the 
important role of economic performance, there is no consensus on which factor 
carries most weight in evaluating economic performance. For example, Li and Zhou 
(2005) conclude that GDP growth rate is the most critical performance measure for 
provincial top leaders, but Bo (2002) finds that fiscal performance is more important. 
In this paper, I show that the growth rate of gross output has a strong effect on the 
probability of getting an upgrade, thus confirming the importance of economic 
performance in the evaluation of local officials.  
Third, the emergence of a large number of cities has had a big impact on China’s 
administrative structure and attracted lots of attention both inside and outside China 
(see, e.g., Au and Henderson, 2006). Existing studies on this subject are mainly 
concentrated in the field of urban economics and regional science. The political 
economic reasons for the emergence and expansion of cities in China have largely 
been ignored.14 This is the first paper to discuss the incentive role of creating cities.  
Two specific advantages of examining county-to-city upgrading bear 
highlighting. First, using county-level data gives many more observations than other 
studies that use provincial-level data, thus increasing the power of tests. Second, as a 
measure of rewards, upgrading suffers much less from omitted variable bias relative 
to the promotion of local officials, which is the focus of many other studies. The 
reason is that upgrading is very costly and irreversible, so that the decision is made in 
a very deliberate way (Wu, 2000). In fact, applications for upgrading are submitted to 
                                                 
13 See Bo (2002, Chapter 1) for a literature review on the political mobility of Chinese local officials; see Besley 
and Case (1996) for theoretical and empirical evidence on how career concerns generate yardstick competition in a 
democratic situation. 
14 For a general discussion of the political economy of city formation, see Henderson and Becker (2000). 
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the Ministry of Civil Affairs through the provincial government, and the final 
decision is made directly by the State Council. Such a strict process is well beyond 
the influence of county leaders. In contrast, the promotion decision of local officials 
is made by the government at just one level higher so that the unobserved factors, 
such as personal relationships, could be relatively important. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the 
background of county-to-city upgrading. Section 3.3 lays out the model and 
hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes the data. Section 3.5 presents the results. The last 
section concludes. 
3.2 Institutional background: county-to-city upgrading in China 
There are four local administrative levels in China: province, prefecture (diqu), 
county and township. At each level, jurisdictions are classified either in a normal 
form, or in a form with the name "city" or "town".15 For example, a province and a 
City Directly under the Central Government (zhixiashi) are both at the provincial 
level; a prefecture and a prefecture-level city are both at the prefecture level; a county 
and a county-level city are both at the county level, a xiang and a town are both at the 
township level.16 In this paper, county-to-city upgrading refers to the reclassification 
of a county into a county-level city.17 From 1983 to 2001, 430 county-level cities 
were established, most of which were created through upgrading. Only 25 of them 
were created by separating out a relatively urbanized area from a county and setting 
up a new government. 
This unique way of creating cities through upgrading stands in contrast to the 
experience of most countries, where "city" and "county" fall into different 
administrative categories. Cities only govern urban centers where population is 
concentrated. Instead of reclassifying a whole county, a new city is normally created 
inside a county. Also, the decision is often made through a voting. For example, in 
                                                 
15 For a detailed description of the Chinese city system, see Chung (1999). 
16 Here are examples of cities at different levels. Shanghai city is at the provincial level, Suzhou city (which 
attracts the largest amount of foreign investment among all cities) of Jiangsu province is at the prefecture level, 
Shunde city (where massive enterprise privatization took place) of Guangdong province is at the county level. 
17 Similarly, there is another type of upgrading, prefecture-to-city upgrading, during which the entire prefecture is 
labeled "city". From 1983 to 2001, more than 160 prefectures were upgraded to prefecture-level cities.  
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the U.S., a new city could be created by adopting a home rule charter. While in Brazil, 
new municipalities are established through local voting. 
The administrative units created through upgrading are different from cities as we 
normally understand the term (Chan, 1997). During upgrading, the entire county, not 
just the town, is labeled "city". Thus, cities include not only the urban centers, but 
also large expanses of rural areas. For example, Eerguna is a county-level city in 
Inner Mongolia. It covers an area of 11,000 square miles, 2/3 of which is forest and 
another 1/6 is grassland. Its population density is about 7 persons per square mile, 
only 1/50 of the national average. Such a "rural" administrative unit was nonetheless 
awarded "city" status in 1994. The Economist (2007b) describes Sansha, a county-
level city consisting mostly of water and desolate islands in the South China Sea, as 
"no more than a bizarre misnomer". The confusion caused by upgrading even leads to 
a lawsuit (see the story about "Huangshan" city in Chung and Lam, 2004). Overall, 
the magnitude of upgrading is very substantial. Since 1983, nearly 15 percent of 
counties have obtained city status. 
The official rule to regulate county-to-city upgrading first appeared in 1983, 
when cities had shown advantages in attracting investment and the demand for city 
status increased in the coastal provinces. Under some rough requirements proposed 
by the Ministry of Personnel and Ministry of Civil Affairs, nearly 100 cities got city 
status during 1983-1986. In 1986, the minimum requirements for city status were 
raised, but were still considered to be very low (Chung and Lam, 2004). The number 
of cities continued to rise and the central government further raised the requirements 
in 1993, setting different standards for counties with different population density. As 
more and more counties became enthusiastic about city status, the central government 
realized that urbanization cannot be achieved by just changing the title to "city". 
Instead, large-scale upgrading has exaggerated the actual urbanization level. It 
eventually stopped approving county-to-city upgrading in mid 1997, only allowing 
prefectures to be eligible to get city status. Until now, county-to-city upgrading has 
not been resumed.  
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Table 1 summarizes the main minimum requirements on industrialization level, 
urbanization level and fiscal strength announced in 1993. One interesting thing to 
note is that counties with lower population density were given lower standards. This 
seems to imply that, in the mind of the central government, setting up cities does not 
follow the usual idea of urban agglomeration. 
By winning city status, local governments gain more administrative authority and 
better political treatment, despite that formal rules tell that the government of county-
level city should share the equal rank in the administrative hierarchy as its 
predecessor. This is the reason to use the term "upgrading". Some county-level cities 
have been awarded deputy-prefecture status, such as Tianmen city in Hubei province 
and Jiyuan city in Henan province. In some other provinces, although deputy-
prefecture status is not explicitly given, the budget of county-level cities has been 
placed under the direct supervision of the provincial government, thus bypassing the 
prefecture level. 18  In addition, local leaders gain some political privileges. For 
example, the party secretaries of many county-level cities are able to enter the 
standing committee of the prefecture-level party committee and enjoy deputy-
prefecture political rank.  
Besides administrative and political upgrade, there are many other benefits 
associated with city status (see Table 2 for an incomplete list). Among them, the most 
prominent one is that cities obtain a huge amount of revenues from the conversion of 
land into non-farm usage (Ping, 2006). My data shows that the average land revenue 
collected by a county-level city is about four times as big as that of a county. 
Moreover, these benefits are not only for the local officials (such as bigger 
government size and higher official rank), but for the whole county as well. For 
example, additional revenues and favorable policies usually result in more urban 
infrastructures. In sum, city status gives localities both political and fiscal benefits. 
The political privilege mentioned above also brings the local government closer 
to higher-level governments, thus facilitating the supervision from above. As will be 
shown later, such supervision will make local governments less likely to defy the 
                                                 
18 This is called "line item under province", or Shengji Jihua Danlie. 
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center when they have potential conflict with the center. However, these small costs 
are overshadowed by the political and fiscal benefits and we observe great enthusiasm 
for city status among counties in the mid 1990s. 
At the same time, upgrading is very costly to the central government. For 
example, the expanded size of the local government will increase salary expenses, 
which are paid out of the central budget. In many upgrading cases, the central 
government also makes subsidies to new cities for their infrastructure construction. 
Besides fiscal burdens, the central government also worries about inequality across 
regions. In my sample, counties that got an upgrade are generally rich ones. Since 
they will further receive favorable policies and fiscal subsidies once getting city status, 
the disparity between poor and rich jurisdictions is likely to increase. Finally, since no 
city has been downgraded to a county, upgrading could be viewed as an irreversible 
administrative change. This irreversibility greatly increases the cost of upgrading if it 
is not desirable to the central government ex post. 
3.3 Hypotheses and empirical strategy 
In this section, I formalize my arguments about the incentive role of upgrading 
into three hypotheses. The first hypothesis relates to the non-enforcement of formal 
rules, the second states the importance of economic growth in determining upgrading. 
The third one is actually composed of two alternative hypotheses that correspond to 
the incentive mechanism and bargaining mechanism, respectively. I also present 
empirical methods used to test each hypothesis. 
3.3.1 Non-enforcement of the formal rules 
As shown in section 3.2, the central government sets certain rules to regulate 
upgrading. A natural hypothesis is that the center wants to enforce these rules. 
However, many scholars (e.g., Liu and Wang, 2000; Chung and Lam, 2004) have 
observed that the official minimum requirements for upgrading are not enforced in 
practice: while eligible counties compete to get upgraded, some ineligible counties 
nevertheless received city status because of special treatment. Chung and Lam (2004, 
p. 953) even report that the Ministry of Civil Affairs "was not in a good position to 
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verify the statistics supplied by the counties". Thus, the first hypothesis of this paper 
is: 
Hypothesis 1: The formal minimum requirements for upgrading are not enforced. 
The data allows me to directly check whether all counties that got an upgrade 
meet the requirements listed in Table 1. To formally test this hypothesis, I will use an 
empirical model (to be introduced in the next sub-section) to examine the importance 
of these requirements. More details will be discussed in section 3.5. 
3.3.2 Main hypothesis and the empirical model 
If those formal rules were not enforced, upgrading should not be just an 
instrument for urbanization. The central government must have other considerations 
when making decisions. That is, there exist some informal rules that were not 
explicitly written in policy documents, but nonetheless played an important role in the 
upgrading decision. It turns out that growth rate is such a critical factor. To give a 
brief preview of the importance of growth rate, Figure 1 displays the number of 
upgrading cases from 1981 to 1997, as well as the corresponding yearly GDP growth 
rate. We can clearly observe several waves of upgrading around 1983, 1988 and 1993, 
which roughly correspond to the periods when China experienced high economic 
growth. Figure 1 suggests that high growth may generate high demand for upgrading, 
thus inspiring me to examine the correlation between growth rate and probability of 
upgrading at the county level. 
To test the positive effect of growth rate on the probability of upgrading, I need 
to control for other confounding factors that affect upgrading. Obviously, 
urbanization level, industrialization level and fiscal strength are important socio-
economic factors since they were listed in the official documents. Thus, the main 
hypothesis of this paper is: 
Hypothesis 2: Conditional on urbanization level, industrialization level and 
fiscal strength, the higher the growth rate, the more likely an upgrading 
would happen. 
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To test this hypothesis, I view upgrading as a discrete choice problem faced by 
the central government and model it in the following way.19 For county i at year t, the 
central government could choose either to upgrade it or not. A latent value Yit* 
represents the difference of utility the center expects to achieve under upgrading and 
non-upgrading. Yit is a binary variable representing upgrading status. The approval 
decision is made according to: 
Yit= 1 (upgrading) if Yit* >0; Yit= 0 (non-upgrading) otherwise 
Here Yit* = f(Git, Zit, εit), in which Git represents growth rate, Zit is a vector that 
includes other county-specific variables such as urban population, industrial output 
and fiscal revenue. The error term εit contains unobserved factors in the decision-
making process. 
Assume that f(Git, Zit, εit) has a linear form, so that Yit* =β0 + Gitβ1 + Zitβ2 + εit, 
and Pr (Yit= 1) = Pr (εit > -β0 - Gitβ1 - Zitβ2). Further assume εit follows a logistic 
distribution, I get the following logit model:  
(1)    Pr (Yit= 1) = Φ (β0 + Gitβ1 + Zitβ2)  
  = exp (β0 + Gitβ1 + Zitβ2) / (1+ exp (β0 + Gitβ1 + Zitβ2)) 
3.3.3 Why growth matters? Two alternative hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that growth matters in getting city status. However, it does 
not tell us the specific mechanism through which growth plays a role. In fact, there 
are two possible interpretations of the positive effect of growth rate on upgrading. 
The obvious one is that the central government uses upgrading to reward counties 
with a high growth rate, which suggests that upgrading serves as an incentive 
mechanism. This interpretation casts the central-local relationship in a principal-agent 
framework. Since the central government (principal) cannot perfectly monitor the 
localities’ (agents) effort in economic development, it uses incentives to elicit good 
                                                 
19 If we assume that 1) all counties started to have a chance of upgrading since 1983, the beginning year of the 
policy, and 2) upgrading to city status is an ultimate outcome for most counties if time horizon is long enough, 
then upgrading could be alternatively treated as a duration problem. Getting city status means the ending of spells, 
and the probability of upgrading is the corresponding hazard. However, since I can only follow the subjects for 5 
periods, it is very difficult to extract any meaningful information on the shape of the hazard of ending the spell. 
Thus, duration model is not adopted in this paper. 
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economic outcomes represented by a high growth rate. In contrast, some scholars 
have argued that the central-local relationship in China is much more like bargaining 
(e.g., Shirk, 1993; Lampton, 1992). Accordingly, upgrading could be viewed as a 
result of central-local bargaining. High levels of economic performance, 
approximated by a high growth rate, strengthen the bargaining power of the local 
government and provide it with greater leverage in getting an upgrade. This 
interpretation is also consistent with the result that a higher growth rate leads to a 
higher probability of upgrading. Thus I have the following competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3A (Incentive): The central government uses upgrading as a 
reward in an incentive mechanism. 
Hypothesis 3B (Bargaining): Upgrading is a result of political bargaining, in 
which a high growth rate strengthens the bargaining power of a county, and 
thus helps it to get city status. 
These two hypotheses display different pictures of China’s politics of governance. 
The incentive hypothesis assumes that the center has a tight control over local 
governments. The bargaining hypothesis, however, puts local officials in a more 
powerful position in playing political games with the center. Although the Chinese 
Nonmenklatura system gives authority over local official appointments to the center, 
it does not mean that the local government is always weak. As the notorious saying 
tells, "Whenever there is a policy top-down, there is a strategy bottom-up (Shang you 
zhengce, xia you duice)." Sometimes non-cooperation is used as a strategy to confront 
the center (see examples in Shirk, 1993). To some extent, the bargaining hypothesis 
suggests that the center is "forced" by local governments to give out the city 
recognition. When describing the administrative changes in the reform era, Chan 
(1997, p. 86) mentions "pressure from below for faster change and more thorough 
reform builds up". Chung and Lam (2004, p. 953), based on interviews with 
government officials, claim that the Ministry of Civil Affairs "often found it difficult 
to resist political pressure from below" in approving upgrading applications. The non-
enforcement of the official upgrading requirements further raises doubts on the 
central government’s capacity to enforce pre-announced policies and gives some 
 40
support to the bargaining argument. Besides, anecdotal evidence also suggests the 
existence of case-by-case negotiation in upgrading (Su, 2000). 
In fact, the bargaining hypothesis has a long tradition in the study of Chinese 
politics. Lampton (1992, p. 34) writes that "bargaining is one of the several forms of 
authority relationship in China. ... bargaining remains a key feature of the system 
[after 1989]." Naughton (1992) states that both the center and localities are equipped 
with bargaining power when specific policies of economic reform are being decided. 
Shirk (1993) studies the central-local relation from the perspective of accountability. 
Since the top leaders were elected by the Central Committee members, among whom 
provincial leaders form the largest bloc, she argues that central leaders have to 
compete for the support of provincial leaders, so that the bargaining position of the 
provinces is strengthened. These studies treat bargaining and mutual compromise as 
the working mechanism between the central and local governments, and form the 
background for my bargaining hypothesis. 
Mei (2006) uses a simple graph to highlight the difference between the principal-
agent and the bargaining models based on their emphasis on local officials’ political 
power (Figure 2). By putting these two models together with models of full 
centralization and full decentralization, this graph clearly shows that the bargaining 
model ascribes more political power to the localities relative to the principal-agent 
model, while both models are not as extreme as full centralization or decentralization. 
Empirical literature on the bargaining mechanism is also fairly developed. For 
example, several studies have shown that the provincial representation in the Central 
Committee affects resource allocation across provinces (Sheng, 2005; Su and Yang, 
2000; Huang, 2001). Maskin et al. (2000) further shows that the provincial 
representation depends on the power of a province composed by its population, 
economic size and fiscal contribution. Thus, this strand of literature is consistent with 
the bargaining hypothesis that economic performance strengthens local bargaining 
power. This paper goes one step further by directly comparing the bargaining 
mechanism with the principal-agent incentive mechanism. 
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Since counties cannot negotiate directly with the central government due to their 
low position in the administrative hierarchy, bargaining takes place between 
governments at adjacent hierarchical levels. For example, as the county government 
gains political privileges and administrative authority through upgrading, the 
prefecture government will necessarily lose some power. Therefore, to get the 
prefecture government’s support on its upgrading attempt, the county will have to 
negotiate with the prefecture. More importantly, since the application for upgrading is 
through the provincial government, there is central-local bargaining between the 
center and provinces. In fact, provincial governments, as representatives of their 
subordinate counties, have played an important role in competing for city status.20 
The bargaining power of provincial governments will be partly determined by the 
economic performance of counties in candidacy.  
3.3.4 Incentive versus bargaining: empirical strategy 
In order to distinguish the two competing hypotheses, incentive versus bargaining, 
I examine the behavior of city and county governments in situations where the center 
and localities have divergent interests. The logic is as follows. 
According to the bargaining hypothesis, counties get upgraded because of their 
strong bargaining power. Since city status brings political privileges to local officials, 
local bargaining power should be strengthened through upgrading. Thus, when there 
is any divergence between central and local interests, city status makes localities 
more capable of pursuing local interests against the center. Moreover, the best time to 
do so is right after upgrading when local bargaining power would be at its strongest. 
Thus, we should see a larger divergence between central and local interests just after 
cities get upgraded. 
In contrast, the incentive hypothesis suggests that the center maintains control 
over localities, and it alone decides which counties get upgraded. City status 
facilitates administrative supervision, thus helping the center to better align local 
interests. This hypothesis predicts that cities are less likely to act against the central 
                                                 
20 Ren and Wang (1999) give an example showing that the provincial bureau of civil affairs is crucial in helping 
counties to get city status. 
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government. Moreover, the detailed evaluation process of upgrading is equivalent to 
performing ex ante monitoring over local governments, meaning that newly upgraded 
cities are least likely to make decisions that diverge from the center’s wishes.  
In sum, these two hypotheses have different predictions on how city status is 
going to affect the way local governments promote local interests at the cost of the 
central government. By comparing counties with cities, and furthermore, newly 
upgraded cities and old ones, I can test one hypothesis against the other. 21 This 
requires me to have a proper measure of divergence between central and local 
interests. 
In China, the existence of local "extra-budgetary funds" (EBFs) as opposed to 
"within-budgetary fiscal revenue" provides a good example of the conflict between 
central and local interests. EBFs consist of all resources managed directly or 
indirectly by administrative branches of the government outside the normal budgetary 
process. EBFs are concentrated at the sub-national level and not subject to treasury 
management or budgetary oversight (Wong and Bird, 2005). In times of fiscal stress, 
local governments respond by introducing a large number of fees, charges, and 
revenues from land leasing, which are not shared with, and often not reported to, 
higher-level governments. Park et al. (1996) show that local governments have 
become very practiced in hiding income in extra-budgetary accounts, making it 
extremely difficult for the central government to monitor true deficits. Ping (2006) 
finds that increases in the administrative cost of local governments are due to EBFs, 
which softens the budget constraint of local governments.  
With these properties, EBFs could be regarded as a measure of local budgetary 
independence. It is in local governments’ interest to maintain or even increase the size 
of EBFs. In contrast, the central government would like to minimize EBFs relative to 
within-budgetary fiscal revenue in order to extend its control over local officials. In 
fact, the central government has tried hard to curb local extra-budgetary fiscal 
activities. Huang (1996, p. 47) has shown that "since 1986 the State Council has 
                                                 
21 This method is consistent with Huang (1996, Chapters 6-8), who distinguishes between a bargaining hypothesis 
and a control hypothesis when studying the impact of local officials’ bureaucratic status on the way they handle 
the central-local investment conflicts. 
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attempted to manage the extra-budgetary revenues and expenditures more centrally." 
In 1997, the central government ruled that as many as thirteen types of "local 
government funds" should be brought from extra-budget to within-budget, which 
shows the center wanted to impose supervision over EBFs. However, this rule failed 
to fundamentally change the ability of local government to control EBFs (Ping, 2006). 
The fight over EBFs is going on between the center and localities and it clearly 
reflects the conflict of central and local interests.  
Thus, the ratio of EBFs to within-budgetary fiscal revenue serves as a good proxy 
for the divergence of local interests from the center’s. If the bargaining mechanism 
dominates, I expect this ratio to be higher for cities than for counties. Among cities, 
newly upgraded ones should have a ratio higher than old ones. If the incentive 
mechanism dominates, the opposite should happen. The empirical model is: 
(2) Ratioit = β0 + Cityi * β1 + Newcityi * β2 + Zit * β3 + vt + εit  
Where Ratioit is the ratio of EBFs to within-budgetary fiscal revenue for county i at 
year t. Cityi is a dummy for city status. Newcityi is a dummy for newly upgraded cities, 
whose definition will be discussed in section 3.5. Zit is a vector of control variables 
that include GDP, population and growth rate; vt is the year dummy; εit is the error 
term. While β1 is the effect of having city status, β2 is the additional effect of being 
newly upgraded conditional on having city status. The sign of the estimate of β1 tells 
us which mechanism dominates. Whether β2 has the same sign with β1 will provide a 
further check. In short, the prediction of the two competing hypotheses is: 
Incentive hypothesis: β1 < 0, β2 < 0 
Bargaining hypothesis: β1 > 0, β2 > 0 
3.4 Data 
Systematic data on Chinese jurisdictions below the provincial level is difficult to 
collect. While several papers have employed prefecture-level data to study the 
incentives of local officials (e.g., Li and Bachman, 1989; Landry, 2003), no one has 
ever used county-level data to do so. The difficulty is two-fold. On the one hand, 
statistics of counties are distributed in the statistical yearbooks of each province, 
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making it hard to build a relatively complete data set. On the other hand, the 
traditional measure of rewards to local officials, promotion, is almost impossible to 
find for county-level officials. 
To overcome these difficulties, I use data from the yearly series of Sub-
Provincial Public Finance Statistics, which was publication by the Ministry of 
Finance starting in 1999. It covers all county-level jurisdictions during 1993-2004 and 
includes detailed public finance information, as well as data on basic socio-economic 
conditions. At the same time, I use upgrading to capture the rewards to county leaders, 
substituting for the usual measure, promotion. The specific benefits associated with 
city status make upgrading a reliable measure of rewards. In contrast, the existing 
literature using promotion as a measure of rewards often faces the problem of 
identifying when mobility is a true promotion and when it is not.22 The reason is that, 
under the Chinese bureaucracy, the actual power and political benefits enjoyed by an 
official may be hard to discern using only his or her job title (Mei, 2006).  
As summarized in Rawski and Xiao (2001), there exist concerns about the 
accuracy of China’s economic statistics in the literature. Specifically, the 
administrative use of statistical indicators as a way to evaluate local officials’ 
performance has been argued to supply the chief motivation for false reporting 
(Zhang, 1999). Here, I address the issue of data quality from three perspectives. First, 
the public finance data set used in this paper is compiled by the Ministry of Finance. 
It is very difficult to manipulate statistics on local public financial activities, such as 
fiscal revenue, because every single statistic reflects actual money flow. In fact, Tsui 
(2005) and Zhang (2006) have used this data set and do not find any significant 
problem. Second, if the local officials in a county did try to inflate statistics for the 
reason of getting city status, they should first inflate urban population, industrial 
output and fiscal revenue in order to meet the official requirements which are 
explicitly announced. Thus, checking whether these requirements are satisfied could 
tell us useful information on local officials’ behavior. If the majority of counties that 
                                                 
22 For example, when a provincial governor is assigned to be the director of the provincial People’s Congress, this 
seemingly lateral move usually means loss of power and usually marks the end of his or her political career. While 
Li and Zhou (2005) attribute this kind of mobility into the same category as demotion, Bo (2002) simply drops 
such kind of observations from his study.  
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got an upgrade did not meet these requirements, then it is hard to believe that false 
reporting is widespread. The test of hypothesis 1 in the next section will do this job.  
Third, even if inflating statistics is a common action, every county should have the 
same incentive to do so. Because my analysis is based on comparing the relative 
economic performance across counties in different regions, it suffers little in such a 
case. For example, if every county inflates its growth rate by a same percentage 
points, the conclusion that high growth rates lead to higher chance of upgrading still 
holds.  
To estimate equation 1, I use data from 1993, the beginning year of the published 
data, to 1997, when upgrading stopped. For county-level cities, I drop observations in 
their post-upgrading period because there is no chance of downgrading or further 
upgrading available (see Table 3 for more details). Data of Xizang (Tibet) is dropped 
because it obviously faces a different policy on jurisdiction administration.  
The key independent variable is the growth rate of Gross Value of Industrial and 
Agricultural Output (GVIAO). Since GDP data is not available before 1998, GVIAO 
is the best consistent measure of a county’s total economic activity. Similar to Li and 
Zhou (2005), I use its growth rate to measure economic performance. As stated above, 
I control for urbanization level, industrialization level and fiscal strength since they 
are official requirements on upgrading. Measures for these requirements include 
industrial output value, share of industrial output value in GVIAO, urban population, 
share of urban population in total population and per capita (within-budgetary) fiscal 
revenue. 
Table 4 shows the comparison of mean values for upgrading and non-upgrading 
cases. A total of 99 upgrading cases are identified through official records from the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs.23 All the output and revenue measures have been adjusted 
to 1993 constant prices using the yearly GDP deflator (growth rate is calculated using 
adjusted values). While growth rate of GVIAO starts from 1994, growth rate of fiscal 
revenue starts only from 1995. The reason is that the 1994 tax reform fundamentally 
changed local tax base and makes the growth rate of fiscal revenue from 1993 to 1994 
                                                 
23 Available online at http://www.xzqh.org. 
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meaningless. Except for these two growth rates, all other variables are averaged from 
1993 to 1997. I also present the p-values of t-test of mean differences between 
upgrading and non-upgrading observations. It is clear to see that there are significant 
differences between these two groups.  
In estimating equation 2, the ratio of local EBFs to within-budgetary fiscal 
revenue captures the divergence between local interests and those of the center. There 
is no direct report of EBFs at county level in my data set. However, various types of 
"local government funds" were reported since 1999. As I have shown in section 3.3, 
these funds were nominally brought from extra-budget into budget by the central 
government in 1997, but were still under the control of local governments (Ping, 2006; 
Wong and Bird, 2005). Thus, these "local government funds" could reflect the 
conflict between central and local interests. I use the sum of them as a proxy for EBFs, 
so that the actual dependent variable is the ratio of the sum of local government funds 
to within-budgetary fiscal revenue.  
Table 5 compares the mean values of key variables between counties and county-
level cities. The sample is from 1999 to 2004 because local government funds are not 
available before 1999. Since upgrading has already been stopped in 1997, there is no 
change in city status in this period, and consequently, I cannot perform a difference-
in-difference exercise. This also explains why Cityi and Newcityi do not vary across 
time in equation 2. In this period, GDP data is available, so I use it to substitute 
GVIAO as the measure of local development level. From the table, it is obvious to 
see that cities, with a greater power on revenue collection, raise much more "local 
government funds" than counties in average. However, the raw mean of the ratio of 
local government funds to within-budgetary fiscal revenue is not very different 
between cities and counties. In the following section, I will compare cities with a 
certain group of counties that have similar properties to cities, as well as controlling 
for confounding variables in the regressions.  
3.5 Empirical results 
This section presents the empirical results. First, I estimate the logit model 
(equation 1) to show that growth rate has a positive effect on a county’s probability of 
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upgrading. The results are robust to alternative definitions of growth rate, as well as 
various specifications and estimation techniques. Then I use stylized facts and results 
from a formal test to show that upgrading requirements are not enforced. After that, I 
estimate equation 2 to test the incentive hypothesis against the bargaining hypothesis. 
3.5.1 The positive effect of growth rate on upgrading 
Baseline results 
To estimate the effect of growth rate conditional on urbanization level, 
industrialization level and fiscal strength, I closely follow those official requirements 
on upgrading and control for industrial output value, share of industrial output in 
gross output, urban population, share of urban population in total population, and per 
capita fiscal revenue in equation 1. All these control variables are lagged by one year. 
Since counties vary greatly in size, I apply a log transformation to these variables 
(except the two shares) to reduce the effect of outliers.  
Table 6 shows the results estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE). Column 1 reports the baseline results, listing coefficients and robust standard 
errors clustered at the prefecture level. The key independent variable, growth rate of 
GVIAO, has a positive and significant coefficient. This finding is consistent with 
hypothesis 2: conditional on urbanization level, industrialization level and fiscal 
strength, a higher growth rate increases the probability of achieving city status.  
Among the five control variables that measure the official requirements, only 
urban population and fiscal revenue per capita have positive and significant 
coefficients. While industrial output and its share in total output have positive and 
insignificant coefficients, share of urban population has a negative and insignificant 
coefficient. To further control for the variation of upgrading policy across years, 
which is common for all counties, I add year dummies (column 2). The only change 
to the estimates is that the coefficient on share of urban population becomes positive, 
but it remains insignificant. In column 3, I add province dummies. This is equivalent 
to ask such a question: what makes a county stand out from its peers in the same 
province in competing for city status? The results are very similar to column 1, 
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suggesting that growth is important in the within-province competition. Examining 
the coefficients of provincial dummies (not shown in the table), I find that counties in 
some poor provinces in western China, such as Guizhou and Gansu, have a higher 
probability of getting city status than the average county. This suggests that the 
upgrading policy may be slightly biased in favor of western provinces. Then I control 
for both year and province fixed effects (column 4). There is little change to the 
estimates of control variables, except that industrial output becomes significant. In all 
these models, growth rate remains positive and significant.  
Since several provinces do not govern any county that was upgraded during the 
sample period, adding provincial dummies means dropping counties in these 
provinces from the estimation. To compare the size of coefficient between the 
baseline model and the one with year and province fixed-effects, I estimate the 
baseline model again on the sample used in column 4. The results are shown in 
column 5. Overall, adding province and year dummies generate a larger coefficient on 
growth rate, which suggests that they capture the effect of omitted variables. For 
example, if the upgrading policy is in favor of provinces with low growth potential, 
such a bias in policy would have a negative correlation with growth and a positive 
correlation with upgrading. Therefore, including province dummies eliminates the 
effect of this omitted variable and increases the coefficient on growth rate. In the 
following alternative specifications, I always report result both with and without fixed 
effects. 
To assess the economic magnitude of the effect of growth rate, I calculate the 
marginal effect. In column 4, the mean value of dPr(upgrading)/dG equals 0.01. This 
implies that when the annual growth rate increases, for example, from 16% (the 
average growth rate) to 26%, the probability of upgrading will increase by 0.001, 
which is about 7% of the average upgrading probability (0.015).24 For the control 
variables that are significant in column 4, I also calculate their mean marginal effect. 
The change in probability of upgrading if industrial output moves from the 25th 
                                                 
24 This magnitude is comparable to the one estimated in Li and Zhou (2005). They show that if the GDP growth 
rate of a province increases by same amount (10 percentage points from mean), the probability of provincial 
leaders getting a promotion increases by an amount that is 24% of the average probability. 
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percentile to the 75th percentile is 0.022, which is about 1.4 times the average 
upgrading probability. For urban population and fiscal revenue per capita, this value 
is 0.026 and 0.007, respectively. These values are in the reasonable ranges. 
Robustness checks 
To check the sensitivity of the baseline results, I adopt alternative definitions of 
growth rate, as well as using various specifications and techniques to estimate the 
logit model. 
Since upgrading decisions are made throughout a year, it is likely that the center 
refers to last year’s performance when making decisions, especially early in the year. 
To check whether the results are sensitive to different timing, I lag growth rate by one 
year and lag all other independent variables (except the year dummies) by two years. 
The results (Table 7, columns 1 and 2) are generally similar to the baseline results 
shown in Table 6, with an even larger coefficient on growth rate. Thus, the results are 
robust to different timing of variables.  
By including all counties in the estimation, I implicitly assume that every county 
has a chance of upgrading and thus faces an incentive. However, some counties 
actually have very little chance of getting city status, so that the upgrading policy 
does not provide any incentive for them to increase growth rates. One group of these 
counties is the nationally designated poor counties, which receive special subsidies 
from the center every year. The official document explicitly states that these counties 
generally should not be considered for an upgrading. Thus, I drop these counties and 
re-estimate the baseline model (columns 3 and 4). The results are little different. 
Furthermore, I adopt alternative measures for growth rate. Chen et al. (2005) 
show that relative performance matters more than absolute performance in evaluating 
provincial officials. Following their method, I subtract the average growth rate of 
counties in the same prefecture from each county’s growth rate and generate an 
alternative growth measure – relative growth rate. Without controlling for fixed 
effects, the relative growth rate is positive but not significant (column 5); once 
province and year dummies are included, relative growth rate has a positive and 
significant coefficient, and the size is even larger (column 6). This suggests that 
 50
relative growth rate is also used as a reference in the evaluation of counties’ economic 
performance.  
Following Li and Zhou (2005), I use average growth rate as another alternative 
growth measure, where the averaging is from the beginning of the sample to the 
current year. This measure corresponds to an evaluation process that is based on both 
the current and past growth rates. The results (columns 7 and 8) show that, although 
not statistically significant, the coefficient on average growth rate has a magnitude 
similar to the baseline results. These exercises show that the baseline results are not 
driven by a particular definition of growth rate. 
On the other hand, some studies have argued that the central government is most 
interested in seeing continuously growing fiscal revenues (e.g., Bo, 2000). So I put 
both the growth rate of fiscal revenue and the growth rate of gross output in the 
regression to see which growth rate is more important (Table 8, columns 1 and 2). To 
estimate this model, I only use data from 1995 to 1997 because the growth rate of 
fiscal revenue starts from 1995. The results show that the coefficient on growth rate 
of fiscal revenue is not significant either statistically or economically; whereas the 
growth rate of gross output remains to be significant. A plausible explanation is: local 
governments sometimes lower the actual tax rate to attract investment, so that the 
high economic growth rates are achieved at the cost of fiscal revenues. Thus, the 
growth rate of fiscal revenue is not used as an important performance indicator in 
practice. 
Since my sample covers several years, upgrading policy may vary during this 
period. Additionally, growth rates in different years may not be comparable to each 
other. For example, a growth rate of 14% is below average in 1994, but is above 
average in 1997. Controlling for year fixed effects could partly take care of this 
problem by allowing different intercepts for different years, but the marginal effect of 
growth rate may also change across time. Ideally, I should estimate the model year-
by-year to check the robustness of the effect of the growth rate in different years. Due 
to the limited sample size and rareness of upgrading cases in some years, I split the 
sample into two periods: 1994-1995 and 1996-1997. The estimation on these two sub-
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samples (columns 3-6) is consistent with the baseline model. In addition, I estimate 
the logit model using a cross-section where each county counts as one observation. In 
this specification, the dependent variable equals one if the county gets upgraded 
during the sampling years, and the independent variables are the average values 
across these years. Although the small sample size generates larger standard errors, 
the results provide evidence on the positive effect of growth rate (columns 7 and 8). 
These tests demonstrate that, even though the upgrading policy may vary across time, 
growth rate always plays a crucial role.   
One caveat to my empirical model is sample attrition. Once a county gets city 
status, it loses the chance of receiving any further reward through upgrading, and its 
probability of having Yit= 1 is zero since then. Thus, in the discrete choice framework, 
post-upgrading observations are ruled out of the estimation (explained in Table 3). In 
this unbalanced panel, the attrition could be non-random if error terms have serial 
correlation across time. For example, if a county suffers a positive shock to the 
idiosyncratic error term in a specific year and gets upgraded, it is dropped out of the 
sample in subsequent years, during which the error term could continue to get 
positive shocks if there is a positive serial correlation. In this case, sample selection is 
correlated with the error term and could induce inconsistency of estimates. To correct 
for this problem, I adopt a probit model with sample selection (Van de Ven and Van 
Pragg, 1981). It is similar to the Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979), except 
that the dependent variable in the outcome equation is also binary. Following 
Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 17.7), I treat the probit of the previous year as the 
selection equation, where non-upgrading means being selected into current year’s 
outcome estimation. Specifically, a probit model of upgrading on growth rate and 
control variables using data of 1994-1996 serves as the selection equation, and the 
outcome equation is another probit using data of 1995-1997. By assuming a bivariate 
normal distribution of the error terms of these two equations, this model is estimated 
using MLE.25 
                                                 
25 The probit model is very similar to equation 1, except that the error term ε is assumed to follow a normal 
distribution instead of a logistic distribution. In the selection equation, the dependent variable equals one in case of 
non-upgrading; in the outcome equation, the dependent variable equals one if upgrading happens. The reason I 
estimate a probit model with sample selection rather than a logit model with sample selection is computational 
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The results are shown in Table 9. Column 1 shows the results of a usual probit 
estimation. The coefficient on growth rate is almost significant (p-value is 0.12). The 
corresponding mean marginal effect (0.0044) is about the same as in a logit model 
(0.0042), which shows that the probit model is little different from the logit model. 
Column 2 shows the results of probit with sample selection. The estimates are very 
similar to column 1. Moreover, the correlation coefficient between error terms of the 
selection equation and outcome equation is not statistically significant, suggesting 
that sample selection is not a severe problem and it does not bias my estimates. 
In sum, various robustness tests provide strong and consistent evidence for 
hypothesis 2, which states that growth rate plays a crucial role in upgrading. 
3.5.2 Testing the non-enforcement of upgrading requirements 
Stylized facts 
To test the non-enforcement of formal minimum requirements for upgrading, I 
first use the data to check whether counties being upgraded during my sample period 
meet these requirements. Table 1 has listed the three main requirements, which are 
concerned with urbanization level, industrialization level and fiscal strength, 
respectively. Each requirement has an absolute criterion and a relative (or per capita) 
one. For counties with different population densities, these upgrading requirements 
are also different. Based on the 1993 data, I summarize the number and percentage of 
counties that meet each criterion, as well as those that meet both criteria of a specific 
requirement (Table 10).26 This table shows that the requirement on urbanization level 
is quite stringent, while the requirement on fiscal strength is less binding. 
Based on the three requirements, I construct three dummy variables: urbanization 
dummy, industrialization dummy and fiscal dummy. Each dummy equals one if both 
criteria of the corresponding requirement are met. For example, for a county with a 
                                                                                                                                           
convenience. The actual estimation is performed by Stata’s command "heckprob".  
26 In the official requirements shown in Table 1, "urban population" refers to those who are engaged in non-
agricultural production. There is no direct report of this variable in my data set. Instead, I have data on population 
with urban registration status. For each population density group, I also know the average ratio of population 
engaged in non-agricultural production to those with urban registration status. Therefore, I am able to get an 
estimate of population engaged in non-agricultural production for each county. I use this estimated urban 
population to tell whether a county meets the requirement on urbanization level. 
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population density above 400 per square km, if its fiscal revenue exceeds 60 million 
RMB yuan and the per capita revenue exceeds 100 RMB yuan in a particular year, 
then its fiscal dummy equals one in this year; otherwise this dummy equals zero. I 
assign all county-year observations in 1994-1997 into different cells according to the 
value of these three dummies and whether there is an upgrading. I count the number 
of observations in each cell and summarize them in Table 11. I further combine those 
cells with an equal number of requirements been satisfied and count the number of 
observations in each cell (Table 12). Among the 99 cases of upgrading, only 6 meet 
all three requirements; 39 meet two, 30 meet only one, and 24 meet none. On the 
other hand, there are 36 cases where all three requirements are met but the counties 
did not get upgraded. This table clearly demonstrates that the official requirements 
are not enforced in practice.  
Given the large variance of development level across regions, it is interesting to 
know whether the degree of enforcement varies in different regions. To do this, I 
divide all counties into three groups according to their geographical location: coastal 
(431 counties), middle (511 counties) and western (736 counties). The upgrading 
cases in these regions are 49, 30, and 20, respectively. The total number of counties in 
the coastal region is only 3/5 of that in the western region, but there are more than 
twice upgrading cases in the former group. This suggests that the upgrading quota is 
not distributed in proportion to the total number of counties in each region. Instead, 
economic growth should play a key role, so that the coastal region has more 
upgrading cases because of its economic prosperity. I then check whether each 
upgrading case meets the three requirements and list the results for the three regions 
respectively (Table 13). It is common to see non-enforcement in all three regions, 
which supports the proposition that upgrading requirements are not enforced in all 
regions. 
However, this table also shows that the non-enforcement of minimum upgrading 
requirements is more severe in the western region. Together with the positive effects 
found on the provincial dummies of some poor provinces in western China, this 
suggests that the chance of getting city status for counties in the under-developed 
provinces may exceeds what their economic performance deserves. This is probably 
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due to the central government’s consideration of balancing regional disparities in 
urbanization level.  
Tests based on the logit model 
To formally test hypothesis 1, I extend equation 1 to allow for flexible functional 
form in the logit model. Basically, I add the three dummies (urbanization dummy, 
industrialization dummy and fiscal dummy) and some interaction terms in the model 
to check whether meeting one or several requirements increase the average 
probability of upgrading and the marginal effect of independent variables. Once these 
results are shown, it will be straightforward to draw the conclusion that the official 
requirements are not enforced. 
In the first step, I allow the marginal effect of three control variables (industrial 
output, urban population and fiscal revenue) to change once the corresponding 
requirement is met. To do this, the three dummies and their respective interactions 
with the three control variables are included in the model. While the coefficients on 
these dummies tell us whether the average probability of upgrading has a jump once a 
requirement is satisfied, the coefficients on the interaction terms would indicate 
whether meeting a requirement changes the marginal effect of the corresponding 
control variable. The results (Table 14, column 1) show that only fiscal strength 
requirement is important. The coefficient on the fiscal dummy is very substantial, 
meaning that once the fiscal requirement is satisfied, the average probability of 
upgrading will jump up by about four times of the average value. The coefficient on 
the interaction term is negative, with a size almost the same as the coefficient on 
fiscal revenue per capita. This means that the marginal effect of fiscal revenue per 
capita entirely fades out once the fiscal requirement is satisfied.  
In the second step, I allow observations that meet some requirement and those 
that fail to meet to have different intercepts and different marginal effects on growth 
rate. To do this, I create a dummy "Meet >=2 requirements", which equals one if at 
least two requirements listed in Table 1 are satisfied by the county. I put this dummy 
and the interaction term with growth rate in the model (column 2). Another dummy 
"Meet >=1 requirement" is defined in a similar way, and the results are shown in 
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column 3. In both columns, growth rate and the dummy are both positive and 
significant, while the interaction term is not statistically significant. This implies that 
satisfying some requirements increases average probability of upgrading, but does not 
change the marginal effect of growth rate. 
In the third step, both growth rate and control variables are allowed for flexible 
functional form (columns 4 and 5). The results are consistent with those displayed in 
the first and second steps. The only exception is that growth rate, "Meet >= 2 
requirements" dummy and "Meet >= 1 requirement" dummy become less significant. 
However, the size of their coefficients remains similar. 
These results are summarized in Figure 3. The upper-left diagram shows that 
meeting some requirements put the county in an advantageous situation to compete 
for city status (i.e., with a higher average probability); but it does not change the 
marginal effect of growth rate does not change. The lower-right diagram shows that 
before meeting the fiscal requirement, an increase in fiscal revenue per capita would 
increase the probability of upgrading. Once meeting this requirement, the average 
probability of upgrading will jump up to a higher level, but additional increase in 
fiscal revenue would not matter any more. The other two diagrams show that 
industrialization requirement and urban population requirement are not important. 
Overall, the fiscal requirement seems to be enforced more strictly than other two 
requirements, which seems to be consistent with the fact that there are more counties 
meet the fiscal requirement than those that meet the other two requirements.  
Since these requirements are supposed to be the "minimum" level for a county to 
be eligible for upgrading, it is reasonable to conclude that the official requirements on 
upgrading are not enforced in practice. Thus, upgrading is not just an instrument for 
urbanization. Whether it is a tool of rewarding or a result of center-local bargaining is 
the task of the next sub-section. 
3.5.3 The incentive hypothesis versus the bargaining hypothesis 
To empirically distinguish the incentive hypothesis from the bargaining 
hypothesis, I examine the effect of city status on the divergence of local interests 
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from those of the center, as measured by the ratio of the sum of local government 
funds to the within-budgetary fiscal revenue.  
As mentioned before, the central government stopped approving county-to-city 
upgrading in 1997. In fact, this change of policy was not publicly announced until 
2000 (Xin Changzheng, 2000), and counties still had an incentive to compete for city 
status in years immediately following 1997. This actually allows me to construct 
propensity scores for hypothetical upgrading probability in 1998 and 1999, which 
could help to control for differences between cities and counties. Specifically, I first 
estimate the baseline logit model using 1994-1997 data. Then I apply the estimated 
parameters to the 1998-1999 data to construct propensity scores. Had the upgrading 
policy continued, propensity scores should represent the probability of getting city 
status predicted by their observed characteristics, and counties with high scores 
should have a fairly large chance to win city status. Thus, except for not having the 
city title, these counties are otherwise similar to cities, especially newly upgraded 
ones. I choose 85 counties with scores higher than 0.1 in any of these two years to 
construct a restricted county sample. 27  Based on observed characteristics, these 
counties are similar to cities, and the comparison between cities and this restricted 
county sample is more meaningful. Henceforth, I call these 85 counties as the 
"comparison group counties." 
Figure 4 draws the average ratio of the sum of local government funds to the 
within-budgetary fiscal revenue for these "comparison group counties," newly 
upgraded cities (upgraded during 1994-1997) and all cities, respectively. Obviously, 
these "comparison group counties" have a much higher ratio than cities, and the 
difference increases overtime. This graph shows that city status makes a difference on 
local governments’ behavior with respect to violating the central interests. 
To estimate equation 2, I run OLS regressions using pooled data from 1999-2004. 
The control variables for county size and development level include log population, 
log GDP and growth rate of GDP. Since local government funds have a strong time 
trend, I also include year dummies. I first show the results without including the 
                                                 
27 The reason to set the cutoff value at 0.1 is to make the number of these counties roughly equal to the number of 
newly upgraded cities. The results are robust to other cutoffs, such as 0.05 and 0.15. 
 57
Newcity dummy. Column 1 of Table 15 reports the result on the full sample, which 
contains all counties and all county-level cities. In column 2, I restrict the sample to 
those "comparison group counties" plus all cities, and call this "restricted sample". I 
then add the Newcity dummy and run regressions on the full sample (column 3) and 
the restricted sample (column 4). I further restrict the sample to only cities and run a 
regression without the City dummy (column 5). This specification directly compares 
newly upgraded cities with old cities. I adopt three different alternative definitions for 
the Newcity dummy. In columns 3-5, newly upgraded cities are those that received 
city status between 1994 and 1997 (no upgrading happens after 1997). According to 
this definition, 99 cities are classified as newly upgraded; the remaining 231 cities are 
classified as "old" cities, which were upgraded between 1975 and 1993. The cutoff 
year for newly upgraded cities is moved to 1992 in columns 6-8, and 1990 in columns 
9-11.  
In columns 1 and 2, the City dummy has a negative and significant coefficient, 
which is consistent with the incentive hypothesis. In other columns, the coefficients 
on City and Newcity are all negative, and the F-tests show that they are jointly 
significant in most cases. Since newly upgraded cities are a subset of cities, it is no 
wonder that the inclusion of Newcity dummy reduces the significance of City dummy. 
The important thing about this specification is that, as stated in section 3.3, having a 
negative coefficient on both dummies provides additional evidence on the incentive 
hypothesis. The coefficient on City dummy is of bigger size in the restricted sample 
than in the full sample, and the significance level is also higher. Since the counties in 
the restricted sample (i.e., "comparison group counties") are a more meaningful 
comparison group, these results give strong support to the incentive hypothesis. In 
sum, the empirical results show that city status helps the center to align local interests 
with the center. Conditional on being cities, a recent upgrading aligns local interests 
with the center even closer. 28 
As shown before, cities generally have greater access to revenue collection than 
counties. For example, the huge amount of revenues associated with land conversion 
                                                 
28 See Huang (2002) for other tools that align local interests with the center. 
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provides city governments with additional flexibility in generating EBFs. My results, 
however, show that city governments nonetheless gave up such power and maintain a 
low level of EBFs relative to within-budgetary revenues. This kind of behavior could 
only be explained by the incentive hypothesis, which tells that the center maintains 
strong control over localities, and city status further facilitates the center’s 
supervision.  
My results provide evidence that the Chinese central government still maintain a 
tight control over local officials. This raises a puzzle: if the center has enough 
authority, why does it fail to enforce those pre-announced upgrading requirements? 
The answer may lie in the experimental and flexible nature of China’s policies. 
During the whole reform era, many policies were first tried in one or several 
provinces and, after proving their effectiveness, were implemented to nationwide 
(Qian, 2000). Also, the actual implementation is often very flexible. As long as the 
underlying issue is not urgent (such as family planning and public safety), policies are 
not implemented with strong central pressure (Lin et al., 2005). In the example of 
county-to-city upgrading, the central government announces formal rules to regulate 
the intense competition at the beginning. Upon receiving a specific application, it 
mainly considers economic performance. Since upgrading serves as a rewarding tool, 
the center also faces the choice between upgrading the county and promoting its 
officials. The decision is likely to be affected by the number of vacant positions that 
could be used in promotion. Thus, the actual decision may well be inconsistent with 
those pre-announced requirements.  
3.6 Conclusion 
Although based on a very specific example, the creation of "cities" in China, this 
paper studies a question that is of very general economic interest: how to provide 
incentives to local governments? I show that economic growth plays an important 
role in determining whether a county was upgraded to a county-level city. I construct 
an empirical test to distinguish whether the effect of growth is a reflection of an 
incentive mechanism or political bargaining. I find that city status helps to align local 
interests with those of the center, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
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central government uses upgrading to reward local officials for high growth. The 
central themes of this paper reflect Fogel’s (2007, p. 10) observation: "the successful 
unfolding of autonomy requires a center strong enough to integrate national and local 
goals … and to provide rewards to those who advance it [the progress of reform]." 
However, one should be noted that upgrading only provides one-time incentive to 
localities and the rewards are for their past economic performance. The fact that the 
average growth rate of new cities quickly returns to normal after upgrading reflects 
the lack of long-term effect. In fact, some scholars consider county-to-city upgrading 
as a policy failure (Liu and Wang, 2000; Chung and Lam, 2004). 
As Au and Henderson (2006) have pointed out, a large fraction of cities in China 
are smaller than the optimal size. The non-enforcement of upgrading requirements 
has certainly contributed to this problem. Cities are not a natural outcome of urban 
agglomeration in China. Instead, as I have shown in this paper, the title of "city" has 
been used as an incentive instrument to serve political purposes. In this sense, my 
paper sheds light on the urban economics literature about city formation and 
expansion in China. 
Additionally, the large-scale upgrading has fundamentally changed China’s 
administrative structure. Many county-level cities are now governed by prefecture-
level cities. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China does not provide for 
the administration of one city (county-level) by another (prefecture-level) (Chan, 
1997). There are intense debates on reforming the current administrative system, 
some of which suggests reducing the number of levels of government. Zhejiang 
province, for example, has started an experiment to let counties and county-level 
cities bypass prefecture-level cities and directly report to the provincial government. 
A recent article on the China Youth Daily (2007) describes how eager the localities 
are to obtain more administrative independence. My paper will facilitate an 
understanding of the current administrative system from a political economic 
perspective. 
I conclude this paper by providing one more insight. Comparing China with 
Russia, Zhuravskaya (2007) points out that "the necessary condition for 
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administrative centralization without local democracy to discipline local 
governments … seems to be efficient growth objectives of central officials." This 
paper shows that the Chinese central government does have a strong growth objective, 
which has been embedded in the policy of setting up cities. However, the emphasis on 
growth also makes local governments obsessed with growth rates and produces some 
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Figure 3. Graphical interpretation of results drawn from Table 14 
 
Note: The upper-left diagram shows the relation between growth rate and upgrading. The other three 
diagrams show the relation between upgrading and industrial output, urban population and fiscal 
































Note: The vertical axis is labeled by the ratio of the sum of local government funds to within-
budgetary fiscal revenue, which measures the divergence of local interests from the center. The three 
lines represent the average value of this ratio for the three groups, respectively. The "comparison group 




Table 1. Minimum requirements for county-to-city upgrading 
Population density (person/km2) >400 100 - 400 <100 
Percentage of counties in this category 25% 45% 30% 
Industrial output value (yuan) 1.5 billion 1.2 billion 8 billion 
Industrialization 
level 
Share of industrial output value in 
gross value of industrial and 
agricultural output 
80% 70% 60% 
Size of urban population (engaged 
in non-agricultural production 150k 120k 100k Urbanization level Share of urban population in total 
population 30% 25% 20% 
Fiscal revenue (yuan) 60 million 50 million 40 millionFiscal strength Per capita fiscal revenue (yuan) 100 80 60 
Source: "The Report on Adjusting the Criteria for the Designation of New Cities." Ministry of Civil 




Table 2. Benefits of being a city: an incomplete list 
Category Benefits Source 
Tax and fee Cities enjoy a higher urban construction tax (7% 
compared to 5% for counties); could collect the 
surcharges levied on the issuing of motorcycle 
registration. In Liaoning province, cities could get 1 
to 2 million additional subsidies each year after 
upgrading. 
Chung and Lam 
(2004) 
Zhang and Zhao 
(1998) 
Land-related Cities generally convert more land to non-farm use 





After achieving the status of "line item under 
province" (Shengji Jihua Danlie), cities could report 
directly to the provincial administration to ask for 
investment project 
Su (2000) 




Cities have more authority on foreign trade and 
exchange management; gains authority over police 
recruitment and vehicle administration; could 
establish the branch of custom and large State-
Owned banks; could approve projects with higher 
cap of investment. 





Cities could establish more branches of government 
and have a larger size of government employees 




Sometimes the bureaucratic rank and salary of 
officials are raised after upgrading. 
Liu (2005) 
Reputation Cities generally carry greater prestige and are more 
attractive to investors from outside. 
Gu (1997) 
Chung and Lam 
(2004) 
Wang et al. (1998) 
Note: Given the volatility of Chinese policies, the benefits are continuously changing overtime, and 
benefits listed are not necessarily effective during the same period. 
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Table 3. Construction of the sample for the logit model 
Observation year 
(shaded observations are dropped) Type of jurisdiction Number 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Always a county, never upgraded 1,579 county county county county county
Upgraded to a city in 1997 4 county county county county city 
Upgraded to a city in 1996 23 county county county city city 
Upgraded to a city in 1995 19 county county city city city 
Upgraded to a city in 1994 53 county city city city city 
Already a city in 1993 231 city city city city city 
Note: To estimate equation 1, the sample is from 1993 to 1997 because upgrading was stopped after 
1997. Once a county gets city status, it loses the chance of receiving any further reward through 
upgrading. Therefore, in the discrete choice model, post-upgrading observations (in shaded cells) are 





Table 4. Comparison of mean values: upgrading and non-upgrading cases (1993-1997) 
Non-upgrading Upgrading Variable 





Gross value of industrial and agricultural 
output (GVIAO ,10,000 yuan) 
8,048 145,563 99 651,154 0.000
Per capita GVIAO (yuan) 8,048 3,220 99 8,896 0.000
Growth rate of GVIAO (1994-1997) 6,349 0.164 99 0.246 0.028
Industrial output value 8,048 97,858 99 558,708 0.000
Share of industrial output value in GVIAO 8,046 0.527 99 0.732 0.000
Population (10,000) 8,053 41.7 99 65.2 0.000
Urban population (10,000) 8,046 4.93 99 11.04 0.000
Share of urban population in total 
population 
8,046 0.138 99 0.198 0.000
Within-budgetary fiscal revenue (10,000 
yuan) 
8,053 4255 99 6,980 0.000
Growth rate of fiscal revenue (1995-1997) 4,753 0.185 46 0.168 0.22
Fiscal revenue per capita (yuan) 8,051 92.0 99 122 0.000
Number of public employees per 100 
people 
8,053 3.07 99 2.43 0.000
Note: All the output and revenue measures have been adjusted to 1993 constant prices using the yearly 
GDP deflator. Growth rate is calculated using adjusted values. 
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Table 5. Comparison of mean values: counties and county-level cities (1999-2004) 
County County-level city Variable 
Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Local government funds (10, 000 yuan) 8,683 613 1,857 2,614
Per capita local government funds (yuan) 8,683 15.1 1,855 35.6
Within-budgetary fiscal revenue (10, 000 yuan) 8,683 5,422 1,857 18,377
Ratio of local government funds to within-
budgetary fiscal revenue 8,683 0.105 1,857 0.116
Population (10,000) 8,683 43.6 1,855 72.9
GDP (10, 000 yuan) 8,661 150,811 1,854 544,184







Table 6. Positive effect of growth rate on upgrading - baseline results 
Dependent variable: 1 = upgrade; 0 = no upgrade  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.473** 0.519** 0.546** 0.749*** 0.426* Growth rate of GVIAO 
(0.211) (0.261) (0.224) (0.275) (0.219) 
0.033 0.367 0.456 1.130*** 0.103 Log(industrial output) 
(0.257) (0.301) (0.282) (0.323) (0.267) 
1.934 1.322 2.028 0.950 1.903 Share of industrial 
output (1.267) (1.375) (1.345) (1.454)  (1.788) 
1.949*** 1.584*** 2.189*** 1.600*** 1.978*** Log(urban population) 
(0.369) (0.396) (0.404) (0.395) (0.367) 
-1.304 0.976 -1.374 2.251 -1.341 Share of urban 
population (1.864) (2.002) (2.334) (2.313) (1.317) 
1.097*** 0.650* 1.390*** 0.684** 1.360*** Log(fiscal revenue per 
capita) (0.272) (0.352) (0.276) (0.332) (0.244) 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  
Province Dummies   Yes Yes  
Sample size 6,436 6,436 5,649 5,649 5,649 
Note: Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are listed. 
Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are represented by *, ** and ***. Except for growth rate 




Table 7. Positive effect of growth rate on upgrading – robustness checks 
Dependent variable: 1 = upgrade; 0 = no upgrade 
Lagged timing Exclude poor 
counties 
Relative growth rate Average growth rate 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.790** 1.107** 0.448** 0.739*** 0.326 0.814** 0.609 0.663 Growth rate of GVIAO 
(0.362) (0.470) (0.207) (0.282) (0.379) (0.392) (0.405) (0.438) 
0.313 1.191** -0.060 1.011*** -0.019 1.06*** -0.043 0.98*** Log(industrial output) 
(0.388) (0.482) (0.262) (0.337) (0.255) (0.315) (0.251) (0.317) 
0.099 1.514 2.027* 1.169 -1.620 1.903 2.145* 1.617 Share of industrial output 
(1.736) (2.158) (1.212) (1.488) (1.831) (2.259) (1.217) (1.421) 
1.572*** 1.679** 1.965*** 1.618*** 2.01*** 1.66*** 2.04*** 1.73*** Log(urban population) 
(0.495) (0.664) (0.370) (0.400) (0.369) (0.395) (0.369) (0.400) 
0.700 -0.468 -1.889 1.579 2.103* 1.121 -1.689 1.332 Share of urban population 
(2.117) (2.741) (1.975) (2.390) (1.256) (1.429) (1.858) (2.314) 
1.076*** 1.574*** 1.041*** 0.625* 1.12*** 0.732** 1.13*** 0.752** Log(fiscal revenue per capita) 
(0.299) (0.444) (0.269) (0.335) (0.272) (0.331) (0.271) (0.335) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample size 4,754 3,904 4288 3885 6,436 5,649 6,441 5,654 
Note: Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are listed. Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are 
represented by *, ** and ***. In columns 1 and 2, growth rate is lagged by one year, all independent variables, except for year dummies, are 
lagged by two years. 
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Table 8. Positive effect of growth rate on upgrading – robustness checks (continued) 
Dependent variable: 1 = upgrade; 0 = no upgrade 
With growth rate of 
fiscal revenue 




Average value for all 
variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.642** 0.718* 0.343 0.592* 0.659* 0.686* 1.27* 0.967 Growth rate of GVIAO 
(0.348) (0.441) (0.297) (0.345) (0.390) (0.401) (0.696) (0.884) 
0.023 0.206       Growth rate of fiscal 
revenue (0.802) (0.851)       
0.602* 1.32*** 0.177 1.128*** 0.176 1.272** -0.541 -0.276 Log(industrial output) 
(0.354) (0.469) (0.312) (0.382) (0.528) (0.591) (0.396) (0.474) 
1.52 0.777 1.844 1.451 1.531 -0.704 3.00* 2.50 Share of industrial output 
(1.87) (1.99) (1.731) (1.770) (2.521) (2.524) (1.78) (2.03) 
1.60*** 1.60** 1.978*** 1.648*** 1.376** 1.739** 2.92*** 3.58*** Log(urban population) 
(0.563) (0.628) (0.459) (0.481) (0.554) (0.722) (0.546) (0.598) 
0.952 1.07* -1.527 1.518 1.985 6.517* -6.76*** -8.01*** Share of urban population 
(2.39) (0.561) (2.811) (3.209) (2.865) (3.470) (3.02) (3.57) 
0.861* 1.15** 0.919*** 0.340 0.767 1.348** 2.55*** 3.65*** Log(fiscal revenue per 
capita) (0.524) (0.513) (0.264) (0.444) (0.488) (0.575) (0.512) (0.487) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Province dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample size 4785 3931 3266 2699 3170 2511 1685 1486 
Note: Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are listed. Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are 
represented by *, ** and ***. In columns 7 and 8, the independent variables are the average values during 1994-1997 (or from 1994 to 




Table 9. Correction for sample attrition – probit model with sample selection 
Dependent variable: 1 = upgrade; 0 = no upgrade
Probit  Probit with sample selection 
(1) (2) 
0.23 0.23 Growth rate of GVIAO 
(0.15) (0.15) 
0.097 0.096 Log(industrial output) 
(0.16) (0.16) 
0.33 0.31 Share of industrial output 
(0.74) (0.73) 
0.68*** 0.65*** Log(urban population) 
(0.21) (0.19) 
0.12 0.17 Share of urban population 
(0.99) (0.97) 
0.51*** 0.48*** Log(fiscal revenue per capita) 
(0.18) (0.16) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
 0.23 Correlation coefficient between 
error terms in selection equation 
and outcome equation 
 (0.46) 
Sample size 4910 4910 
Note: Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are listed. 
Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are represented by *, ** and ***. Column 1 is 
estimated using data of 1995-1997. In column 2, selection equation is estimated using data of 
1994-1996; outcome equation is estimated using data of 1995-1997. 
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Table 10. Number of counties that satisfied each upgrading requirement in 1993 
Number of counties (total is 1,678) Requirement Criterion for this 
requirement Meet one criterion Meet both 
Industrial output 329 (19.6%) Industrialization 
level Share of industrial output 290 (17.3%) 158 (9.4%) 
Urban population 212 (12.6%) Urbanization level Share of urban population 212 (12.6%) 67 (4.0%) 
Fiscal revenue 444 (26.5%) Fiscal strength Per capita revenue 976 (58.2%) 352 (21.0%) 





Table 11. Number of county-year observations by upgrading status and requirements 
satisfied (1994-1997) 















1005 375 14 31 
Fiscal 
dummy=0 











Table 12. Number and percentage of county-year observations by upgrading status 
and number of requirements satisfied (1994-1997) 
Number of requirements 
satisfied 0 1 2 3 total 
4,583 1,313 463 36 6,395 Non-upgrading cases 
(71.6%) (20.0%) (7.0%) (0.5%) (100%) 
24 30 39 6 99 Upgrading cases 
(24.2%) (30.3%) (39.4%) (6.1%) (100%) 
 
 

















Coastal 49 31 18 34 15 8 41 
Middle 30 15 15 14 16 5 25 
Western 20 5 15 11 9 3 17 
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Table 14. Non-enforcement of upgrading requirements – allowing flexible intercept 
and marginal effect 
Dependent variable: 1 = upgrade; 0 = no upgrade  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.731** 0.668* 0.799** 0.643 0.740* Growth rate of GVIAO 
(0.289) (0.376) (0.358) (0.392) (0.378) 
 0.722**  0.577  Meet ≥ 2 requirements 
 (0.365)  (0.377)  
  0.789**  0.636 Meet ≥ 1 requirement 
  (0.370)  (0.416) 
 0.025 -0.181 0.093 -0.101 Interaction term 
 (0.591) (0.490) (0.580) (0.511) 
0.917** 1.052*** 1.033*** 0.882** 0.831** Log(industrial output) 
(0.386) (0.327) (0.322) (0.383) (0.381) 
-0.566   -0.784 -1.766 industrialization dummy 
(4.824)   (4.862) (4.799) 
0.114   0.116 0.201 Interaction term  
(0.390)   (0.392) (0.387) 
1.715*** 1.541*** 1.569*** 1.705*** 1.726***Log(urban population) 
(0.457) (0.407) (0.396) (0.463) (0.452) 
0.131   0.374 0.043 Urbanization dummy 
(2.117)   (2.053) (2.136) 
-0.334   -0.467 -0.333 Interaction term 
(0.790)   (0.769) (0.794) 
1.088** 0.465 0.469 1.003** 1.003** Log(fiscal revenue per 
capita) (0.449) (0.380) (0.346) (0.470) (0.461) 
5.223**   5.484*** 5.090** Fiscal dummy 
(2.056)   (2.119) (2.109) 
-1.039**   -1.113** -1.040**Interaction term 
(0.432)   (0.448) (0.444) 
0.190 0.761 0.753 0.232 0.179 Share of industrial output 
(1.404) (1.446) (1.501) (1.385) (1.440) 
3.608 2.087 2.173 3.589 3.528 Share of urban population 
(2.545) (2.351) (2.351) (2.536) (2.576) 
Sample size 5649 5649 5649 5649 5649 
Note: All columns include year and province dummies. Coefficients and robust standard errors 
clustered at the prefecture level are listed. Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are 
represented by *, ** and ***. Except for growth rate, requirement dummy and their interaction 
term, all other independent variables are lagged by one year. 
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Table 15. Incentive versus bargaining- results 
Dependent variable: ratio of the sum of local government funds to within-budgetary fiscal revenue 
 "Newcity" = 1 if upgrade after 
1994 
"Newcity" = 1 if upgrade after 
1992 




































-0.013* -0.047** -0.012 -0.047**  -0.006 -0.040*  -0.002 -0.036  City 
(0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.022)  (0.008) (0.023)  (0.009) (0.023)  
  -0.004 -0.0002 -0.002 -0.018 -0.015 -0.017 -0.020* -0.019 -0.020*Newcity 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
0.021*** 0.023** 0.021*** 0.023** 0.025** 0.021*** 0.022* 0.024** 0.021*** 0.023* 0.025**Log(GDP) 
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011)
-0.011 -0.005 -0.011 -0.005 -0.008 -0.011 -0.004 -0.008 -0.011 -0.003 -0.007Log(population) 
(0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014)
-0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.016 -0.013 -0.012 -0.016 -0.013 -0.012 -0.015Growth rate of 
GDP (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017)




  0.14 0.11  0.04 0.03  0.03 0.02  
R-squared 0.08 0.19 0.08 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.19 0.18 
Sample size 10,269 2,098 10,269 2,098 1,823 10,269 2,098 1,823 10,269 2,098 1,823 
Note: All columns include a full set of year dummies. Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are listed. Significance 
levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are represented by *, ** and ***. Full sample include all counties and county-level cities; restricted sample include all cities 
and "comparison group counties"; city sample only include cities. 
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Chapter 4: The Consequences of Administrative 







In China, awarding the title of city to existing counties has created more than 400 
new urban administrative units from 1983 to 1997. Using this county-to-city 
upgrading as an example, this paper examines the consequences of administrative 
decentralization. I merge data from the local public finance statistics with the 
population census and get a rich set of economic, fiscal and public services outcome 
variables. Using difference-in-differences (DID), propensity score matching, and 
DID propensity score matching methods, my finding confirms that city status 
increases government size and revenues, and creates more urban employment 
opportunities. However, there is no significant improvement in local public services 
after upgrading, and the high economic growth rates in pre-upgrading period drop to 
a normal level after upgrading. These results are interpreted by analyzing the 
incentive structure of local government officials. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The theory of fiscal federalism says that decentralization has allocative benefits in 
providing public goods and services (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). Specific to 
China, there is a general consensus that fiscal decentralization promoted inter-
jurisdictional competition and spurred market development during the reform era 
(Qian and Weingast, 1996; Lin and Liu, 2000; Jin et al., 2005). However, a few 
studies also raised the concern that decentralization may have had a negative 
distributional effect (Park et al., 1996; Knight and Li, 1999; Zhang and Zou, 1998). 
Zhang (2006) further argues that under a centralized governance structure, fiscal 
decentralization could lead to severe regional disparity in income level. 
In fact, decentralization took place not just in the form of devolving taxing and 
spending powers to the local government. Cai and Treisman (2006) distinguish three 
types of decentralization in China: administrative decentralization, fiscal 
decentralization, and political decentralization. Although the Chinese political system 
has remained centralized (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Zhang, 2006), there have 
been experiments of political decentralization at the grassroots-level. Zhang et al. 
(2004a) and Shen and Yao (2008) study the effect of village head elections and find 
positive effects on income equality and local public goods provision. In contrast to 
the attention paid to fiscal and political issues in the literature, few studies have 
investigated the effects of administrative decentralization. Whether the devolution of 
administrative powers to the local level improves local public services is especially 
under-researched. 
My paper addresses this issue by looking at the practice of urbanization through 
administrative orders in China. From 1983 to 1997, more than 400 counties were 
awarded city status through “county-to-city upgrading” (Chung and Lam, 2004). 
Since upgrading greatly increases the administrative independence and revenue 
collection power of local governments, it could be viewed as an example of 
administrative decentralization. By increasing the number of cities and giving them 
more authority, the policy goal of upgrading is to speed up economic growth and 
urbanization process. Furthermore, it intends to give local governments some 
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leverage to provide better public services. 29  Thus, the focus of this paper is to 
examine whether upgrading achieved these policy goals, and furthermore, to explore 
the reasons. 
Empirically, I evaluate the effect of upgrading using counties that have never 
been upgraded as the control group. In order to control for the pre-treatment 
differences, a difference-in-differences (DID) method is adopted. I merge data from 
two sources, namely the local public finance statistics and the population census. This 
gives me a large dataset that contains a rich set of economic, fiscal and public 
services outcomes at the county level. Because some variables are available only in 
the post-upgrading period, I use a propensity score matching method to conduct the 
evaluation. Combining the advantage of both DID and matching, a difference-in-
differences propensity score matching method is also performed. 
I report the following major findings. First, I find a larger increase in immigration 
and urban population in cities relative to counties. In addition, cities create more jobs 
in manufacturing and the service sectors. Second, fiscal revenue and the number of 
public employees increase more quickly in cities, suggesting an expansion of local 
government activities. The increase in total revenue is accompanied by a decrease of 
the share of agricultural tax. Third, economic growth rates of newly established cities 
drop from a high level to a normal level after upgrading. Last but not least, there is 
little difference in the level of educational achievement, public health outcomes and 
living conditions between counties and cities. 
The first two findings are largely expected given the nature of upgrading. By 
winning city status, the localities gain many benefits. As shown in the previous 
chapter, they usually receive subsidies to improve urban infrastructures. Cities are 
allowed to impose a higher urban construction tax rate and have higher quotas to 
convert agricultural land into urban usage. At the same time, local governments also 
gain more administrative authority and revenue collection power. They are allowed to 
                                                 
29 In the “Report on the Sixth Five-Year Plan” made in 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang states that “Except for special 
cases, the administrative power of enterprises should be decentralized to cities, bypassing the central ministries 
and provinces. We should change cities, especially big cities, into open, multi-functional, modern economic 
centers and form an economic network that based on big cities while including surrounding small cities and 
towns.” (Available at http://www.people.com.cn/zgrdxw/zlk/rd/5jie/newfiles/e1170.html) 
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set up more government branches and expand the number of public employees after 
getting city status. These favorable policies naturally lead to an increase in the level 
of urbanization and industrialization.  
The other two findings are somewhat surprising. With all those favorable policies, 
it is normally expected that cities to have some advantage over counties in economic 
development and thus maintain a higher growth rate in the post-upgrading period. 
Similarly, with more administrative independence and revenue collection power, 
cities should be able to provide better public services according to the theory of 
federalism. In order to interpret these findings, it is important to examine the 
incentives of local officials. As shown in the previous chapter, upgrading serves to 
reward localities with high growth rates and thus gives the central government an 
informal way of providing incentives. Together with the formal approach, political 
promotion, it forms part of the incentive system for Chinese local officials.  
Before upgrading, under both the formal and informal incentive mechanisms, 
local officials compete on economic growth to please the upper level government. 
After becoming cities, there is no further upgrading chance available to localities, 
resulting in the disappearance of the informal incentive mechanism. Since the formal 
incentive mechanism could not be expanded in a short period of time to make up the 
loss of the informal incentive mechanism, local officials may suddenly lose part of 
their incentives to maintain a high growth rate. Thus, given the importance of local 
officials’ incentives in China (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu et al., 2007), the change in the 
incentive structure of local officials must play a key role in the drop of growth rates. 
 In terms of the provision of public goods and services, city status does not bring 
in any new incentive. According to Mei (2006), local officials are multi-task agents 
in the political hierarchy. Without changes in the evaluation criteria, they always 
choose to perform tasks whose intended outcomes could be easily realized and are 
more predictable. Since providing public goods, such as education and health, does 
not have an immediate and certain effect on their economic performance, local 
officials always lack the proper incentive to work hard on these issues. Thus, it is not 
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surprising that I do not find any evidence of significant improvement in local public 
goods outcomes.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the 
data and gives some brief descriptive analysis. Section 4.3 discusses the empirical 
strategy. Section 4.4 reports the results of the DID estimation. Section 4.5 reports the 
matching results. Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Data and descriptive analysis 
The major outcome variables are from the two recent population censuses that 
were conducted in 1990 and 2000, respectively. Assembled at the county level, they 
provide rich information on education, health, migration, urbanization and 
employment. Merging the two censuses together, I get the “census dataset” that is a 2-
period panel data with observations in 1990 and 2000. 
The census dataset does not provide information on economic conditions and 
government activities, such as GDP, fiscal revenue and expenditure. In order to 
estimate the propensity score of upgrading and to get more outcome variables, I also 
use the yearly series of Sub-Provincial Public Finance Statistics 1993-2004 
(henceforth “public finance dataset”). Since it only starts in 1993, I drop cities that 
were upgraded before 1994 because I lack data to estimate their upgrading propensity 
score (one-year lagged data is used in the estimation). I keep all counties in the 
sample as the control group. Jurisdictions that were counties before 1994, but got 
upgraded to cities during 1994-1997 form the treatment group (upgrading policy 
stopped at 1997).  
Merging the two datasets allows us to compare various outcomes both before and 
after upgrading. For most outcomes from the public finance dataset, I have data 
continuously from 1994 to 2004. Table 1 lists the 1994 and 2004 mean values for 
cities and counties, respectively. In total I have 1537 counties and 99 cities being 
upgraded during 1994-1997. Growth rate is not listed in this table because I do not 
have a continuous measure from 1994 to 2004. While GDP data is not available 
before 1998, Growth value of industrial and agricultural output (GVIAO) is not 
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available after 2000. Instead, I will use a graph to compare growth rate between 1994 
and 2004 later in this section. There are several interesting observations from this 
table. First, the number of public employees increases much more quickly in the cities 
relatively to counties. Second, the increase in the share of productive public 
expenditure (basic construction expenditure plus expenditure supporting agricultural 
production divided by total expenditure) seems to be slower in cities. Third, cities 
have much more extra-budgetary revenue and land revenue than counties in 2004.  
Table 2 lists the 1990 and 2000 mean values of variables from the population 
census dataset. I restrict the sample to those that will appear in the empirical studies 
in section 4.5. In total, there are 95 cities and 1001 counties. From a preliminary 
check on these raw means, it is easy to see that urban population, immigrants and 
employment in the manufacturing and service sectors growth faster in cities relative 
to counties. In contrast, for public service outcomes, such as education and crude 
death rate, there seems to be little difference in the change from 1990 to 2000 
between cities and counties.  
The previous chapter has shown that a high growth rate increases the chance of 
getting an upgrade; and this works through an incentive mechanism. Once counties 
have achieved city status, there is no further chance of getting reward through 
administrative upgrade. Thus, local officials’ incentives may be weakened after 
upgrading, which could results in the decrease of growth rate. I use a graph to 
compare the average growth rate of all county-level jurisdictions and those that were 
upgraded from counties to cities during 1994-1997 (Figure 1). Since GVIAO is not 
available after 2000, I use the growth rate of GDP to show the trend of 2000-2004. It 
is easy to see that the growth rate of cities that were just upgraded dropped sharply 
after 1997 and became normal compared to counties in later years. 
I then focus on cities that were upgraded from counties in recent years. Figure 2 
depicts the trend of growth rate before and after their upgrading. Negative number on 
the horizontal axis represents years before upgrading, during which they were still 
counties. Similarly, positive numbers means years after upgrading. Both the actual 
growth rate and the growth rate relative to national average show the same trend: in 
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years right before upgrading and when upgrading happens, the average growth rate of 
these jurisdictions are at a high level; after upgrading, it starts to drop; two years after 
upgrading, it falls below the national average. After that, the average growth rate 
returns to the national average and stays around there. This figure shows that counties 
that eventually got an upgrade are not born with high growth rates. Instead, high 
growth rates are closely associated with the opportunity of getting an upgrade, which 
suggests that incentives play an important role in explaining the fluctuation of growth 
rates before and after upgrading. 
4.3 Empirical strategies 
4.3.1 Difference-in-differences model 
Assuming that cities and counties have a parallel time trend for outcome Y, then a 
straightforward way to estimate the effect of city status on Y is a DID model 
(1) Yit = β0 +β1* Upgradei + β2*Postt + β3*Upgradei *Postt + εit  
Upgradei is a dummy for upgrading, Postt is a dummy for post-upgrading period, and 
the interaction term, Upgradei *Postt, equal one for cities in their post-upgrading 
years. Since each upgrading case happens in different years, Postt varies across cities, 
and it is not even defined for counties. Thus, equation (1) needs to be modified before 
I can actually run the regression. I use a full set of year dummies to substitute Postt. 
This, however, will not affect the definition of Upgradei *Postt. So the actual 
empirical model is 
(2) Yit = β0 +β1* Upgradei + β2*Year Dummyt + β3* Upgradei *Postt + εit  
In equation (2), β3 measures the average effect of city status on outcome Yit after 
controlling for pre-upgrading differences. This model could be applied to evaluate 
outcomes from both the public finance dataset and the census dataset, as long as they 
are available in both pre- and post-upgrading periods. For the public finance dataset, 
since I have yearly data from 1994 to 2004, I can decompose the average effect of 
upgrading into effects in different post-upgrading years. To do this, I replace the 
Upgradei *Postt dummy with ten dummies: Upgradei*Post0t, Upgradei*Post1t, … , 
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Upgradei *Post9t. Among them, Upgradei*Post0t equals to one for cities in the year 
they were upgraded, Upgradei*Post1t equals to one for cities in the first year after 
upgrading, etc. The model is 
(3) Yit = β0 + β1*Upgradei + β2*Year Dummyt + (β30* Upgradei *Post0t  
+ β31*Upgradei*Post1t + … + β39*Upgradei *Post9t) +εit 
where β30 measures the average effect of upgrading for the year of upgrading, β31 
measures the average effect of upgrading for the first year after upgrading, etc. 
Equation (3) allows me to detect the time pattern of the effect, such as immediate vs. 
gradual and temporary vs. permanent. 
4.3.2 Propensity score matching  
Some important outcome variables are available only in post-upgrading years. For 
example, land revenue is available in 2000-2004 in the public finance dataset, and 
housing condition is only available in 2000 in the census dataset. For these outcomes, 
I cannot perform DID estimation. In order to control for the pre-upgrading differences 
between counties and cities, I use propensity score matching to evaluate the effect of 
upgrading (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, 2002). Based on 
the analysis on the determinants of upgrading in the previous chapter, I use a logit 
model to estimate the propensity score of upgrading during 1994-1997 
(4) Pr (Yit= 1) = exp (β0 + Gitβ1 + Zitβ2) / (1+ exp (β0 + Gitβ1 + Zitβ2)) 
where G represents growth rate, Z is a vector that includes lagged values of variables 
appearing in the upgrading requirements, such as urban population, industrial output 
and fiscal revenue.  
Then I combine counties and cities with different observed characteristics but 
same propensity scores using matching. The matching estimator is 
(5)  
1 ( , )Matching i j
i county city j county







∑ ∑  
where i represents those that were upgraded from counties to cities during 1994-1997, 
j represents those that remain to be counties. The match for each upgrading case i is 
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constructed as a weighted average over the outcome of control group – counties. The 
weight, W (i,j), depends on the distance between the propensity scores for i and j. In 
this paper, I construct the weights using a kernel function that is standard in the 
literature (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
4.3.3 Difference-in-differences propensity score matching  
For outcomes from the census data and are available in both 1990 and 2000, I also 
conduct the difference-in-differences propensity score matching (Heckman et al., 
1997; Heckman et al., 1998). The estimator is defined as 
(6) ,2000 ,1990 ,2000 ,1990
1 ( ) ( , )( )DID i i j j
i county city j county





= − − −⎨ ⎬
⎩ ⎭
∑ ∑  
The difference of this DID propensity score matching estimator from the matching 
estimator in the previous subsection is that it allows for systematic differences 
between upgrading and non-upgrading outcomes after conditioning on observables. It 
is analogous to the standard DID regression estimator defined in Section 4.3.1, but it 
does not need to impose a linear functional form on the model and it re-weights the 
observations according to the weights used by the matching estimators. According to 
Smith and Todd (2005), DID matching generally performs better than cross-sectional 
matching estimators. 
4.4 Difference-in-differences estimation results 
Table 3 shows the DID estimation results based on equation (2). The outcome 
variables are from the public finance dataset, including fiscal revenue, number of 
public employee, fiscal revenue per public employee, share of productive expenditure 
in total expenditure, and share of agricultural tax in total revenue.30 While the first 
two variables tell us about the expansion of government activities, the other three 
variables provide additional information on fiscal condition and revenue and 
expenditure structure of the local government. Since all these variables are available 
                                                 
30 It is possible that fiscal revenue and public employee follow log normal distributions, so that their log values are 
better dependent variables. I have conducted robustness checks using their log values as dependent variables and 
the findings are very similar. Since these variables are more meaningful in their levels, here I only report estimates 
using their levels as dependent variables. 
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continuously from 1994 to 2004, Table 4 further decomposes the average effect of 
upgrading into effects in different post-upgrading years based on equation (3).  
Column (1) of Table 3 shows that the average effect of upgrading on fiscal 
revenue is positive, with a magnitude of about 15% of the average value. The 
decomposed effects shown in column (1) of Table 4 display an interesting time 
pattern. The effect is negative in the first three years after upgrading and then become 
positive starting in the fourth year. This may suggest that although upgrading gives 
more revenue collection power to the local government, it does not increase the local 
revenue in the short term. However, upgrading has a long-term effect on revenue 
generating. 
As Luo and Zhang (2006) point out, under the centralized governance structure in 
China, the size of local government is largely in proportion to local population, 
unless there is a change in the governance structure. Column (2) of these two tables 
confirms the effect of such a change. There is an immediate increase in the number of 
total public employee right after upgrading, and it continues to grow in the post-
upgrading period. The average increase is as large as twenty percent relative to 
counties. 
The increase in fiscal revenue and public employees is consistent with the fact 
that local officials gain more administrative independence and discretionary power 
through upgrading. Analogous to firm managers who maximize their control rights, 
local officials prefer a larger government. Administrative decentralization gives them 
some leverage to expand the local government activities in terms of both revenue and 
employees.  
Fiscal revenue per public employee is used to measure the fiscal dependent 
burden (Zhang, 2006). The lower the fiscal revenue per public employee, the less 
capable the local government is to support its employees, thus the heavier the fiscal 
dependent burden. With a huge increase in the size of public employees, it is 
interesting to know whether this burden becomes more severe after upgrading. In 
column (3) of Table 3, I do not find significant difference in revenue per public 
employee between cities and counties. But once this effect is decomposed into 
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different years (Table 4, column 3), it appears that the fiscal dependent burden 
actually becomes more severe in the first seven years after upgrading, suggesting that 
the expansion of the number of public employees overshadows the increase of 
revenue, at least in the short term. 
Column (4) of both tables examines how the expenditure is distributed into 
productive investment in agriculture and basic construction. This part of expenditure 
is called “productive” as opposed to another important part, administrative costs of 
the government. The negative estimate suggests that cities spent a less proportion on 
this part. Again, this may be largely due to the quick expansion of government size.  
Finally, column (5) of both tables shows a negative effect of upgrading on share 
of agricultural tax in the total revenue. This suggests that the focus of local 
government has shifted away from agriculture.  
In sum, all these results shown in Table 3 and 4 are consistent with the 
proposition that upgrading decentralizes administrative power to the local 
government and allows them to generate more revenues and inflate the size of public 
sectors. 
4.5 Matching results 
4.5.1 Estimating propensity scores 
The results for the logit estimation of the propensity score could be found in 
column 1 of Table 6 in the previous chapter. Figure 3 shows the histograms of the 
estimated propensity score for counties (upper panel) and cities (lower panel). 
Following Smith and Todd (2005), I match on the odds ratio of propensity score, 
P/(1-P), rather than on the propensity score P itself, so that the estimates are robust to 
choice-based sampling. The histograms of the log odds ratio are shown in Figure 4. 
These figures give us a graphical assessment of the extent of common support. It 
looks that the propensity scores have a lot of overlap for cities and counties. In fact, 
only two cities do not have support in the counties, and they will be excluded in 
matching. 
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In order to check whether the conditioning variables used to construct propensity 
score in equation (4) satisfy the conditional independence condition, I need to 
perform a balancing test. The general idea is to test whether or not there are 
differences in these variables between cities and counties after conditioning on the 
propensity score. In this paper, I follow Smith and Todd (2005) to conduct a 
regression-based balancing test for each conditioning variable. For example, for 
growth rate G, I run the following regression 
(7) 
2 3
0 1 2 3 0
2 3
1 2 3    
it it itit it
it it itit it it it
G P P P Upgrade
Upgrade P Upgrade P Upgrade P
β β β β γ
γ γ γ ε
= + + + +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
 
where P is the estimated propensity score. Then I test H0: 0 1 2 3 0γ γ γ γ= = = = . Failing 
to reject H0 means that conditional on the polynomials of the propensity score, 
interactions of the treatment dummy with these polynomials have no additional 
impact on the conditioning variable. This suggests that the balancing condition is 
satisfied. The F-statistics for these tests are generally small, with p-values all above 
than 0.1, suggesting that I can not reject H0. In sum, both the histograms and the 
balancing tests suggest that the conditional independence condition and common 
support conditions are satisfied. 
In estimating the logit model (4) using data of 1994-1997, I get one propensity 
score for each jurisdiction-year observation. Thus, each county or city has multiple 
propensity scores. For the treatment group – cities, it is straightforward to keep the 
propensity score corresponding to treatment, that is, the one in the upgrading year. 
For the control group – counties, I keep propensity scores in all four years and treat 
them as independent control observations in the actual matching. This allows us to 
use all information of the control group in terms of the probability of getting 
treatment in any of these years. 
4.5.2 Matching results 
Table 5 shows the propensity score matching results for three variables that are 
available only in the post-upgrading period. The first variable, floor space per person, 
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comes from the census dataset. The estimate is not significant, suggesting that cities 
do not outperform counties in this indicator of people’s well-being.  
The other two variables come from the public finance dataset.31 I find that extra-
budgetary funds are significantly higher in cities relative to counties. This is 
consistent with the fact that city status gives local governments more discretion over 
revenue collection, so that they can raise more funds from sources that are out of the 
budget.  
Another outcome variable is the revenue from land. According to Zhang et al. 
(2004b) and Ping (2006), industrialization and urbanization have driven up the 
demand for land and dramatically increased land value since 1990s. Thus, local 
governments have a strong incentive to convert agricultural land into non-farm usage, 
and in turn increase their revenue. The significant result of land revenue shows that 
increased administrative authority brought by city status helps local governments to 
achieve this goal. 
4.5.3 Difference-in-differences propensity score matching results 
For outcome variables from the census dataset, I perform a DID propensity score 
matching to estimate the effect of city status on the change of their values from 1990 
to 2000. Together with the DID propensity score matching, I also perform a 
regression-adjusted matching, which controls for the same set of conditioning 
variables as in matching, but uses a linear functional form. To do this, I run an OLS 
regression of the difference between 2000 and 1990 values on the Upgradei dummy 
and all the conditioning variables used to construct propensity score in logit model.  
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients and corresponding t-ratios. The 
outcomes are grouped into four categories: public goods and services, urbanization, 
immigration and employment. For level variables, I present the estimates on their log 
values. To make this table easy to read, I use a positive t-ratio to indicate that cities 
are doing better than counties, and add a negative sign before t-ratios if the sign of 
the coefficient suggests that cities are doing worse. For example, since the increase in 
                                                 
31 The findings on extra-budgetary revenue and land revenue are also robust to the using of their log values as 
dependent variables 
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the attendance rate of secondary and above education is smaller in cities relative to 
counties (with a coefficient of -0.00026), the t-ratio is labeled as negative (-0.14). 
Thus, for those “bad” outcomes (illiterate ratio, crude death rate, disabled population, 
disability rate, percentage of people working as farmers, employment in agriculture 
and mining), a negative t-ratio means that cities have a smaller reduction or a bigger 
increase than counties. 
In terms of the provision of public goods, I generally do not find much difference 
between counties and cities. The attending rate in secondary and above-level schools, 
the crude death rate and the disabled population are not significant. In terms of the 
reduction in illiterate ratio, cities are doing even worse than counties, which may be 
due to a low initial value. The number of disabled population increases more quickly 
in cities (although not significant), which could be the result of increased demand for 
more dangerous jobs, such as construction workers.  
For urbanization indicators, cities are found to be performing better. Urbanization 
process seems be sped up by favorable policies accompanied with city status. Also, 
the number of farmers and employment in the agricultural and mining sectors 
decreases faster in cities. Results on the employment variables are largely consistent 
with the expectation that cities should provide more jobs in the industry and service 
sectors. More job opportunities in cities could also explain the significant increase in 
the number of immigrants in cities.  
In sum, these results show that upgrading helps local jurisdictions to speed up 
urbanization process and create more urban employment opportunities. However, 
these economic prosperities do not seem to have led to better public goods and 
services, at least in the short term. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Using county-to-city upgrading as an example of administrative decentralization, 
this paper examines its consequences on a wide range of economic, fiscal and public 
service outcomes. I employ several empirical methods to conduct the estimations, 
 92
including difference-in-differences, propensity score matching, and difference-in-
differences propensity score matching methods.  
My results confirm the expansion of government revenue and public employees 
due to upgrading. Due to the loss of informal incentives in the incentive structure of 
local officials after upgrading, economic growth rate falls in newly upgraded cities. 
Although city status increases the urbanization level and helps to create more jobs in 
industrial and service sectors, it does not directly improve the provision of local 
public goods and services. The reason is that upgrading does not provide local 
officials with new incentive to work hard on these issues. 
This paper highlights the importance of local officials in making policies 
effective in China. Even if the central government has designed a good policy, it is 
hard to get expected effect without the cooperation of local officials. In short, it is 
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Note: This graph compares the average growth rate of all county-level jurisdictions and those that 
were upgraded from a county to a city during 1994-1997. GVIAO means the growth value of 
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Note: This graph shows the trend of average growth rates for county-level jurisdictions that have 
experienced upgrading. The horizontal axis represents the time difference between current year and the 
year of upgrading. Year "0" means the year of upgrading, year "-1" means the year right before the 
upgrading year and year "1" means the year right after upgrading. The upper line draws the average 
growth rate of GVIAO. The earliest upgrading case reflected in this graph took place in 1985, and the 
growth rate in 1994 is used to calculate the average growth of year "9". In contrast, if upgrading took 
place in 1997, the growth rate of 1994 is used to calculate the average growth of year "-3". The lower 
line, normalized growth rate, is drawn in a similar way using growth rate relative to the national 
average value (average of all counties and county-level cities). For example, for a city upgraded in 
1985, I subtract its 1994 growth rate by the 1994 national average value and use it to calculate the year 
"9" average growth rate. 
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Table 1. Mean value of variables from public finance dataset 
  treatment group: city 
control group: 
county 
N 99 1537 
Year 1994 2004 1994 2004 
Fiscal revenue (10,000 RMB) 6355 15720 2358 5683 
Public employee 13112  17263  9010  11847  
Public employee per 100 people 2.2 2.8 2.8 3.5 
Fiscal revenue per public employee (10,000 
RMB / person) 0.49 0.98 0.25 0.49 
Industrial and business tax (10,000 RMB) 6522  9337  2294  3470  
Industrial and business tax rate 5.11% 4.63% 7.83% 7.18% 
Agricultural tax rate 3.20% 3.30% 2.80% 3.10% 
Share of agricultural tax in total revenue 27.30% 18.50% 37.20% 26.50% 
Provide any subsidies to the firms 18.68% 3.30% 25.76% 4.30% 
Productive expenditure per capita (RMB) 22670  76863  18836  126753 
Share of productive expenditure in total 
expenditure 8.36% 9.07% 7.97% 10.96% 
Extra-budgetary funds (10,000 RMB)  3373  1049 
Revenue from land (10,000 RMB)  1465  542 
Note: All the output and revenue measures have been adjusted to 1993 constant prices 
using the yearly GDP deflator. 
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Table 2. Mean value of variables from population census dataset 
  treatment group: city control group: county 
N 95 1001 
year 1990 2000 1990 2000 
population (1,000 people)     
 total 629 658 412 421 
 > 6 yrs 555 615 360 393 
 > 15 yrs 455 502 292 320 
Educational achievement 
 % illiterate (among > 15yrs) 19.7% 8.1% 24.9% 11.2% 
 % illiterate (male, among > 15yrs) 10.6% 3.9% 15.4% 6.5% 
 % illiterate (female, among > 15yrs) 29.2% 12.4% 35.0% 16.1% 
 % illiterate (among > 6yrs) 18.2% 8.7% 22.9% 11.6% 
 % primary (among >6yrs) 44.8% 40.5% 44.4% 41.6% 
 % middle school (among >6yrs) 28.2% 38.3% 24.9% 35.7% 
 % high school (among >6yrs) 8.1% 10.5% 7.3% 9.3% 
 % above secondary(among >6yrs) 0.7% 2.0% 0.6% 1.8% 
Health related 
 # of children born alive per woman 2.15  1.42  2.25  1.49  
 # of surviving children per woman 2.02  1.40  2.07  1.45  
 Crude death rate (deaths per 1000) 6.16 6.18 6.47 6.27 
 disabled population 16.6k 21.9k 11.6k 14.5k 
 disability rate 3.7% 4.3% 4.0% 4.5% 
Living condition 
 space per person (square meters)  24.4  22.4 
Urbanization 
 Percentage of urban population 14.7% 19.8% 13.1% 16.1% 
Immigration  
 total immigrants (1,000 people) 12.4  57.1  6.5  23.1  
 immigrants from other province 4.7  18.4  2.3  4.7  
 immigrants / total population 2.49% 9.24% 2.25% 6.89% 
Total employment rate (among >15yrs) 78.5% 79.8% 78.9% 82.4% 
 by occupation:     
 technician 3.5% 3.4% 3.5% 3.4% 
 government agencies 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 
 office workers 1.1% 1.7% 1.1% 1.4% 
 sales and service 4.2% 6.1% 2.9% 4.5% 
 agriculture 56.3% 46.5% 63.1% 55.9% 
 production 12.3% 12.0% 7.3% 7.3% 
Employment size by sector (1,000 people) 
 agriculture 275 237 197 183 
 mining and quarrying 5.1 3.7 2.3 1.8 
 manufacturing 39.7 50.9 13 15.5 
 electric, gas, water supply 1.25 1.87 0.57 0.92 
 construction 5.5 11.3 1.98 4.3 
 geology and water 0.63 0.37 0.36 0.21 
 transportation and storage 5.8 8.8 2.8 4.3 
 commerce 12.7 21.3 6.2 10 
 banking and insurance 0.95 1.48 0.57 0.78 
 real estate 0.32 0.29 0.14 0.12 
 social service 1.70  5.70  0.86  2.50  
 health, sports 2.10  3.10  1.30  1.78  
 education and culture 6.69  7.82  4.40  4.84  
 research 0.18  0.18  0.09  0.10  
  government 5.19  6.89  3.32  4.20  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Upgrade 6023*** 3600*** 0.406*** 1.487** -0.068*** 
 (909) (615) (0.077) (0.734) (0.014) 
761* 1896*** -0.073 -2.862*** -0.047*** Upgrade *Post 
(390) (457) (0.058) (0.777) (0.016) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.17 
Obs 20215 20195 20190 11412 19985 
Standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are in the parenthesis. Significance levels of 10%, 5% 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Upgrade 5983*** 3584*** 0.404*** 1.508** -0.068*** 
 (908) (615) (0.077) (0.739) (0.014) 
-1688*** 944*** -0.173*** -1.643*** -0.049*** Upgrade *Post0 
(515) (313) (0.067) (0.596) (0.015) 
-1381*** 805** -0.160** -2.663*** -0.072*** Upgrade *Post1 
(488) (404) (0.067) (0.684) (0.016) 
-1352** 1537*** -0.178*** -2.228*** -0.069*** Upgrade *Post2 
(654) (419) (0.063) (0.815) (0.019) 
-385 1968*** -0.151** -2.358*** -0.061*** Upgrade *Post3 
(440) (478) (0.059) (0.805) (0.019) 
331 2015*** -0.112** -2.635*** -0.052*** Upgrade *Post4 
(432) (470) (0.048) (0.860) (0.017) 
688 1977*** -0.073 -3.156*** -0.028* Upgrade *Post5 
(831) (492) (0.064) (0.937) (0.017) 
1704* 1924*** -0.027 -3.160*** -0.036** Upgrade *Post6 
(941) (525) (0.061) (0.918) (0.015) 
2321** 2164*** 0.029 -3.461*** -0.028* Upgrade *Post7 
(1055) (587) (0.069) (1.006) (0.017) 
2673** 1954*** 0.065 -3.163*** -0.044** Upgrade *Post8 
(1115) (614) (0.080) (1.029) (0.020) 
4060*** 3422*** 0.059 -3.950*** -0.046* Upgrade *Post9 
(1503) (928) (0.078) (1.075) (0.027) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.17 
Obs 20215 20195 20190 11412 19985 
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Table 5. Propensity score matching results 
 Coefficient t-ratio 
Floor space per person in 2000 0.296 0.37 
Extra-budgetary funds (1999-2004) 970 6.0 









 coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
Public goods provision and outcomes   
 Illiterate ratio (above 15yrs) 0.00525 -0.81 0.0155 -2.71***
 Ratio of attending secondary and above education (among > 6yrs) 
-0.00086 -0.58 -0.00026 -0.14 
 Crude death rate 0.01 -0.11 0.3 -0.24 
 Log(disabled population) 0.020 -0.66 0.039 -1.43 
 Disability rate -0.00102 0.86 0.00037 -0.33 
Urbanization     
 Urban population ratio 0.0048 1.15 0.0104 1.76* 
Immigration     
 Log(total immigrants) 0.111 1.79* 0.127 2.01** 
 Log(immigrants from other province) 0.223 2.45** 0.195 2.09** 
 Ratio of immigrants in population 0.00579 1.34 0.00477 0.79 
Employment     
 Percentage employed 0.0158 1.06 -0.00253 0.18 
 Percentage of people working in office 0.00074 1.36 0.00079 1.32 
 Percentage of people working in sales or service 0.00011 0.08 0.00054 0.33 
 Percentage of people working as farmers -0.00096 0.11 -0.0139 1.51 
 Employment size by sector (1,000)     
 Log(employment in agriculture) -0.029 1.31 -0.044 1.55 
 Log(employment in mining) -0.22 1.64* -0.11 0.99 
 Log(employment in manufacturing) 0.069 1.26 0.066 1.24 
 Log(employment in electricity and water supply) -0.063 -1.06 -0.070 -1.27 
 Log(employment in construction) -0.026 -0.30 0.025 0.29 
 Log(employment in geology) 0.14 1.19 0.056 0.45 
 Log(employment in transportation and storage) -0.014 -0.30 0.026 0.60 
 Log(employment in commerce) 0.006 0.17 0.018 0.48 
 Log(employment in banking and insurance) 0.034 1.4 0.087 2.8*** 
 Log(employment in real estate) 0.21 2.1** 0.089 1.05 
 Log(employment in social service) 0.036 0.68 0.055 1.14 
 Log(employment in health and sports) 0.071 2.5*** 0.102 4.1*** 
 Log(employment in education and culture) 0.027 1.0 0.057 2.83*** 
 Log(employment in research) -0.015 -0.13 -0.077 -0.67 
 Log(employment in government) 0.067 2.14** 0.092 3.02*** 
Note: A positive t-ratio means cities are doing better than counties. A negative sign means cities are doing 
worse. For “bad” outcomes (illiterate ratio, death rate, disabled population, disability rate, employment in 
agriculture and mining), a negative t-ratio means a smaller reduction or a bigger increase in cities relative to 
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